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CHURCH AND STATE
Did the Founding Fathers Want Strict Separation or Just Non-Preferential
Treatment?
The Plain Dealer Cleveland, OH, Sunday, July 23, 1995
Julia Lieblich
Newhouse News Service
Whether God is on their side or not, they are
convinced they have the Founding Fathers.
Conservatives and liberals alike invoke the names
of Madison and Jefferson to support their views on
church-state issues: from school prayer and vouchers
to the support of religious groups by
government-funded institutions. Always contentious,
the 200-year-old debate has taken on new urgency as
the Religious Right accuses judges and politicians of
driving religion from public life.
Rep. Ernest Istook, R-Okla., is among those who
believe that the First Amendment allows the
government to support religious activity. "Our
Founding Fathers understood that our fundamental
rights do not come from government, but from God,"
Istook told a House judiciary subcommittee on the
Constitution.
But Nadine Strossen, president of the American
Civil Liberties Union, maintains that the framers
intended the government to take a hands-off role,
neither helping nor hindering religion.
The wording is simple: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." But what the
founders meant is tough to discern.
Leonard W. Levy, author of "The Establishment
Clause: Religion and the First Amendment," notes
that the "historical evidence . . does not speak in a
single voice with clarity and insistence." It lends itself
to contradictory interpretations and sometimes
dubious efforts of interested parties to ascertain the
framers' intent, he said.
To complicate matters further, some scholars say
intent is irrelevant because it doesn't reflect today's
political and social reality. And former judge Robert
Bork, a scholar in legal studies at the American
Enterprise Institute, is among those who prefer the
phrase "original understanding," or what the
Constitution would have meant to a reasonable person
at the time.
"We're not trying to figure out what James
Madison had in his skull," Bork said.
Still, scholars concur that given the frequency
with which the founders' intent is invoked, it is critical
to examine their actions.
Interpreters tend to fall into two camps:
separationists who believe in a total division between
matters of church and state, and nonpreferentialists,
who say that nothing in the Constitution bans federal
sponsorship of religion in general if no religion in
particular is given preference.
Most scholars agree that the founders wanted to
avoid replicating on the national level the experience
of the states, which had a history of supporting one or
more established religions. In James Madison's home
state of Virginia, people had been forced to fund the
Anglican Church through taxation, notes Rob Boston,
author of "Why the Religious Right is Wrong."
Quakers and Catholics were initially barred from the
state. And during the "Great Persecution" from 1768
to 1774, Baptists were frequently jailed or whipped.
In this less-than-liberal climate, Madison fought
hard for religious liberty as a member of the Virginia
House of Delegates. When Patrick Henry introduced
a bill in the Virginia legislature in 1784 that would
have required "a moderate tax or contribution annually
for the support of the Christian religion," Madison
took his case against establishment to the people,
Levy notes. Madison's paper, "Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments," now
regarded as a classic in religious freedom, listed 15
reasons for rejecting Henry's bill.
"Who does not see that the same authority which
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any
particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other
sects?" Madison wrote.
Some scholars see the document as a
nonpreferentialist tract. Daniel L. Dreisbach,
professor ofjustice at American University, believes
the paper shows Madison's fear of showing preference
for one religion over another. He was not, Dreisbach
argues, against facilitating religion in public life.
But others think that "Memorial and
Remonstrance" demonstrates just as clearly a
separationist position. "Madison believed that it was
wrong to aid religion, whether one group or 500," said
Boston, assistant communications director of
Americans United for Separation of Church and State.
Bork, often called a nonpreferentialist, agrees that
in "Memorial and Remonstrance" Madison made a
strong argument for separation.
Bork believes it's irrelevant, however, given that
Madison "didn't express these extreme separationist
views to Congress during discussions of the First
Amendment."
Separationists find any event or document that set
the stage for the establishment clause relevant. And
they cite Madison's 1785 resurrection in the Virginia
legislature of Thomas Jefferson's 1777 bill for
religious freedom as another example of Madison's
commitment to church-state separation. "No man shall
be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place or ministry whatsoever," the bill stated.
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Still, during this same period, Madison
recommended bills to protect Anglican church
property, punish Sabbath breakers and people who
disturbed public worship, and fix a date of prayer and
fasting.
"Jefferson and Madison," Levy notes, "were by no
means absolutists on the question of the separation of
government and religion."
The topic of religion rarely came up during the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, except when
discussing the prohibition of religious tests for
political office. Some delegates pressed for a
recognition of Christianity in the document, but they
were unsuccessful. The framers did not begin their
deliberations with a prayer, and the final document
contained no references to God.
Some scholars contend that mentions of God were
omitted because Christianity was accepted as the basis
of common law, and the Declaration of Independence
introducing the Constitution referred to God. Boston
thinks the decision was more deliberate. "They had to
be careful not to put anything in that would lead
people to believe the government had any right to
meddle in religion," he said.
Deliberations on the Bill of Rights brought the
topic of religion to the fore. Madison wrote the first
draft of what would become the First Amendment:
"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account
of religious belief, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
Conscience in any manner or on any pretext be
infringed."
Supreme Court Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist wrote in a 1985 opinion that the
amendment "forbade the establishment of a national
religion," but did not "prohibit the federal government
from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion."
Separationists, however, say the amendment was
meant to reassure the states that Congress had no
power to interfere with state establishments nor
support any religious group through aid, sponsorship
or tax support.
Furthermore, Levy notes, the amendment was
meant to restrict Congress to its stated powers, not
create new ones, such as the right to aid religious
groups.
Records of the Senate debate on the amendment
leave much to be desired. "They were prepared by a
man accused of being an ardent partisan, even a
drunk," said Dreisbach. It is clear, however, that the
Senate considered alternate versions that forbid
establishing one religious sect in preference to others.
The failure of these motions, separationists argue,
indicates that the Senate wanted to do more than
outlaw preference. But Bork doesn't see "how you can
read that into what they didn't adopt."
The Senate eventually came up with its own
version of the bill: "Congress shall make no law
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion." The House,
however, refused to accept the wording, which
separationists believe shows that it wanted a rejection
of government aid, not just a rejection of interference.
Although Madison wrote that he believed in "a
perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil
matters," Levy notes that Madison's separation was
less than perfect during his presidency.
On one hand, Boston notes, Madison vetoed an
act incorporating the Episcopal church in the District
of Columbia that gave the church authority to care for
the poor. And he vetoed a proposed land grant to a
Baptist church in Mississippi. But he also voted for
days of fasting and prayer and approved of chaplains
for the armed forces.
Yet Madison later expressed disapproval of both
practices, regarding them as a violation of the First
Amendment. While separationists laud this
about-face, Bork maintains: "You can't give (the
amendment) meaning retroactively."
Still, many separationists and nonpreferentialists
lay claim to a document drafted a decade after the First
Congress' deliberations: Thomas Jefferson's 1802
letter to a group of Baptists describing the First
Amendment. In it he penned his famous metaphor: the
"wall of separation between church and state."
Separationists say it's a two-way wall also
intended to keep the church from infringing in matters
of state. Some nonpreferentialists say it's a
one-directional wall that prevents the state from
interfering with the church while allowing the
government to provide nonpreferential subsidy and
acknowledgment of religion.
"Government did have an interest in facilitating
religion in public life. That was deemed essential to
the social order," said Dreisbach.
But separationists believe that government aid to
religion disrupts that order. "People who want to
subsidize or endorse religion because morality is a
good thing don't understand history," said Levy.
"When the state of New York out of the goodness of
its heart decided to promote prayer in public school,
it prescribed (a prayer that was) bland and
meaningless, which is insulting to particular
denominations.
"The intention is good," he notes, "but it's
disastrous when the government gets authority over
religion." Some scholars contend that mentions of God
were omitted because Christianity was accepted as the
basis of common law.
Lieblich writes about religion, ethics and





Sunday, July 2, 1995
Editorial
With its decision last week requiring the
University of Virginia to fund a student-published
Christian publication, the Supreme Court took a
historic step toward what the 1st Amendment was
meant to assure: government neutrality toward
religion.
The verdict puts no government body in the
business of endorsing any faith or sect. All it does
is grant religion its proper place in the life of the
nation.
University of Virginia students pay a
$14-per-semester fee into a "student activities fund"
to support more than 100 extracurricular
organizations "related to the educational purpose of
the university." These include groups that publish
student news and opinion.
But when a group applied for funds to print an
evangelical Christian newspaper, it was refused,
since regulations prohibited funding any activity
that "promotes or manifests a particular belief in or
about a deity."
The group sued, arguing that its free-speech
rights had been denied. The university responded
that subsidizing a religious publication with
mandatory student fees would violate the Ist
Amendment clause forbidding an "establishment of
religion."
The Supreme Court, however, properly
concluded that the establishment clause does not
bar this sort of aid--and that exclusion of religious
groups from funding amounts to the deliberate
suppression of one viewpoint, in violation of the
free-speech guarantee.
The religion clauses of the 1st Amendment,
wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy for the
five-member majority, are meant to prevent the
government from putting its thumb on either side of
the scale: "The guarantee of neutrality is respected,
not offended, when the government, folowing
neutral criteria, extends benefits to recipients whose
ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones,
are broad and diverse."
That is exactly right. The framers of the
Constitution did not want Americans taxed for the
special purpose of aiding churches. But neither did
they want religious groups and individuals to be
punished for their beliefs. By removing the ban on
religious groups, the University of Virginia would
not be creating an incentive for students to espouse
religious messages--only removing a penalty that
now exists.
Leaders of the religious Right, who have been
pressing for a so-called religious-equality
amendment to the Constitution, took heart from the
Supreme Court's decision--as they had a right to.
We trust that they will be equally enthusiastic
when they understand that the ruling opens the door
not just for Christians but for members of all
religious groups--including some that they may find
less than appealing. But that's what neutrality is all
about.
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JUSTICES SIDE WITH RELIGIOUS GROUP ON FUNDS
The Boston Globe
Copyright 1995
Friday, June 30, 1995
Ana Puga
Globe Staff
Washington -- Providing encouragement to some
religious groups, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday
that because of constitutional free speech guarantees,
a state university may not deny financial support to a
Christian student publication while providing funds
for secular student activities.
The decision alarmed advocates of a strict
separation between church and state, including some
Jewish groups, but delighted many Christian
organizations, because it relaxed the court's general
rule that government may not support religious
activities.
Some Christian groups said they hoped the 5-4
ruling against the University of Virginia would lay the
groundwork for Supreme Court approval of school
voucher programs that would provide government
funds for children to attend religious schools. The
decision might also send the message to public
schools that they may not prohibit speakers at events
like graduations from speaking about religious
subjects, court analysts said.
To obey the constitutional ban on the
establishment of a state religion, Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote for the court's majority, "it was not
necessary for the university to deny eligibility to
student publications because of their viewpoint."
Kennedy concluded that the University of
Virginia's refusal to subsidize the printing costs of a
student Christian magazine violated the free speech
rights of the students because it unconstitutionally
decided to silence their particular message. In so
doing, he and the other members of a majority that
included Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William
Rehnquist wrestled with a longstanding constitutional
tension between two clauses of the First Amendment.
One clause prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the other mandates freedom of speech.
Writing for the dissenters, Justice David Souter
noted that the court "today, for the first time, approves
direct funding of core religious activities by an arm of
the government." Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer joined the
dissent.
If the constitutional ban on state religion "was
meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar
this use of public money," Souter wrote.
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia began in
1991, when a student, Ronald Rosenberger, applied to
the school for $5,800 to cover the printing costs of
Wide Awake, a Christian magazine. A committee of
the student council denied the funds on the grounds
that the school could not constitutionally support a
religious group.
Rosenberger filed suit in federal court, where he
lost. But yesterday the Supreme Court overturned the
decision.
An ebullient Rosenberger handed out releases
with his reaction: "The court has simply restored a
level playing field for students of all faiths."
The Christian Legal Society and dozens of other
Christian groups that filed friend-of-the-court briefs
on Rosenberger's side were also elated.
"The court rejected the idea that any time the
government funds a religion, that is unconstitutional,"
said Greg Baylor, an attorney with the society. "It said
that the government doesn't have to be hostile to
religion."
But the American Jewish Congress was dismayed,
because as a practical matter, when the government
gets involved in funding religions, religious minorities
often suffer, said an attorney for the group, Lois
Waldman.
"Jewish groups have always been very strong
supporters of the free exercise and the establishment
clauses," Waldman said. "As a minority religion, we
won't do well when colleges start funding religious
groups."
A University of Virginia spokeswoman, Louise
Dudley, said that the school's governing board will
change its funding policy to comply with the court's
decision.
Legal analysts said the decision represents an
important but subtle shift in the court's balancing of
speech and religious freedoms.
Lee Bollinger, a First Amendment expert and
former dean of the University of Michigan Law
School, said: "This not a major case, in the sense of
establishing a major set of principles. . . . But it
provides an answer for an important dilemma facing
public institutions: to what extent are they obliged to
provide support to religious organizations for the
purposes of propagating their viewpoint?"
Mark Tushnet, a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center, said the ruling would not
support arguments in favor of school prayer, but could
lead to more expressions of religious views in public
schools, such as teachers opening classes with
religious readings.
"If you think of the metaphor of a wall between
church and state," Tushnet said, "the court has taken
out one brick in that wall."
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HIGH COURT ENDS TERM
Court Calls for 'Neutral' Approach to Religion Issues Judiciary
Los Angeles Times
Copyright, Los Angeles Times 1995
Friday, June 30, 1995
David G. Savage
Times Staff Writer
The Supreme Court gave religious-rights activists
two important victories Thursday, ruling that the
government may not deny funding or free-speech
protections to groups simply because of their religious
beliefs.
Instead, the justices insisted that officials follow
a "neutral" and "evenhanded" approach to matters of
religion so that students or church groups are not put
at a disadvantage because of their faith.
The opinions in the two cases echo the views of
religious-rights activists, who have complained in
recent years that public officials frequently
discriminate against those whose message is religious.
For example, some school officials have believed
that they must tolerate displays of offensive messages
on T-shirts worn by students in observance of
free-speech protections, while banning the display of
references to Jesus on the theory that these references
would violate the separation-of-church-and-state rule.
Similarly, some city officials have believed that
they cannot ban burning of the American flag in a
public park because the action is a free-speech
exercise but they must prohibit the display of a cross
or creche because it is explicitly religious.
In the two rulings, the court's conservative
justices sought to knock down the apparent double
standard affecting religion.
In an Ohio case, the court upheld the display of a
10-foot cross in a public park near the state capital.
Because other groups had rallied and displayed
banners there, the cross could not be excluded simply
because it is a religious symbol, the court said in a 7-2
vote.
"Private religious speech, far from being a First
Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the
free-speech clause as secular private expression,"
wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the court in the case
(Capitol Square vs. Pinette, 94-780).
In the second case, the court ruled, 5 to 4, that the
University of Virginia wrongly denied subsidies to a
Christian students' magazine. The ruling marked the
first time that the court has clearly upheld the use of
public money to subsidize the espousal of religious
views, lawyers said.
Religious-rights activists hailed the two rulings
and said that they indicate the court would uphold
publicly funded "vouchers" for students to attend
religious schools. The decisions also settle a
long-running battle over Christmas displays by
making clear that private groups may erect a creche in
a public square so long as other displays are permitted
there as well.
"The Supreme Court has sent a message loud and
clear that it is unconstitutional to treat religious
students as second-class citizens or religious speech as
second-class speech," said Ronald Rosenberger, a
former University of Virginia student who founded
"Wide Awake," a campus magazine espousing "a
Christian perspective" on contemporary issues.
In 1991, the university subsidized the costs of
other student publications, including those sponsored
by Muslim and Jewish students. But campus officials
turned down Rosenberger's request for funds because
his magazine "manifests a particular belief in or about
a deity."
A federal appeals court in Richmond sided with
the university's decision, concluding that the First
Amendment's ban on an "establishment of religion"
prohibited the use of public money to support a
religious publication.
Disagreeing in the case (Rosenberger vs.
University of Virginia, 94-329), the high court said
that state officials cannot discriminate against
religious groups strictly because of their beliefs.
"The neutrality commanded of the state by the
First Amendment was compromised by the
university's course of action," Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy wrote for the 5-4 majority. It is "a denial of
the right of free speech and would risk fostering
pervasive bias or hostility to religion" if the university
could deny subsidies to the Christian students, he said.
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice David H.
Souter said that the majority "for the first time,
approves direct funding of core religious activities by
an arm of the state." He was joined by Justices John
Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven G.
Breyer.
The court majority, however, noted three
important limits on its ruling.
First, the university itself was not promoting
Christianity. Rather, it was funding all student
publications on a neutral basis.
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* Second, the money was not going to a church
but rather to a student group.
And third, the funds were not supporting an
explicitly religious activity, such as a worship service
or a retreat.
Nonetheless, before Thursday, the court had taken
the view in various opinions that public money could
not be used to promote religious beliefs.
Advocates of church-state separation faulted the
court for knocking down a once-solid barrier.
"This is a miserable decision," said Barry W.
Lynn, director of Americans United for Separation of
Church and State. "Christians at a university have
every right to evangelize through publications but they
shouldn't be allowed to pick other students' pockets to
pay for it."
A leader of People for the American Way, a
civil-liberties group that had supported the university's
position, saw a silver lining in the high court's action.
"Both rulings should knock the wind out of the
sails of the right-wing forces pursuing a so-called
religious equality amendment to the Constitution,"
said Elliot Mincberg, legal director for the group.
On Capitol Hill, religious rights advocates have
been pressing for an amendment to protect religious
liberty and student-led prayer in schools.
But Mincberg said that the amendment is not
needed since the court "makes absolutely clear that the
First Amendment is not hostile to religion."
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SUPREME COURT ASSERTS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
St. Petersburg Times
Copyright 1995
Friday, June 30, 1995
Ellen Debenport
In two long-awaited cases about religious
freedom, the Supreme Court ruled Thursday that the
Ku Klux Klan had a right to erect a cross outside the
state Capitol in Ohio and that the University of
Virginia should have paid to publish a Christian
student magazine.
In neither case, the court said, was government
promoting religion. And in both cases, government
already had accommodated non-religious groups and
publications, so it should do the same for those with
a religious message.
The rulings "amount to the wall of separation
between church and state taking two direct mortar
shots," said Barry Lynn of Americans United for the
Separation of Church and State.
But others saw victory.
"What it means is that religious people can, with
confidence, speak and distribute literature and set up
displays in the same public areas that people with
secular messages can go," said Nicole Kerr, executive
director of the Liberty Counsel in Orlando, a group of
lawyers who work on religious rights cases.
"They have no need to fear government
oppression."
The Supreme Court, in opinions written with a
hint of exasperation, said it had been trying for years
to make this principle clear. A few years ago, the court
ruled that any school offering its facilities to secular
groups had to offer them to religious groups as well.
The same thinking applies here, the majorities said.
But the court splintered on both rulings.
Seven of the nine justices agreed the KKK's cross
should be allowed on Capitol Square in Columbus,
Ohio, but for different reasons. Four, led by Justice
Antonin Scalia, said government must allow religious
speech in public forums, as long as government
doesn't initiate it.
"We have consistently held that it is no violation
for government to enact neutral policies that happen to
benefit religion," Scalia wrote.
Three others, led by Justice David Souter, said the
cross would be okay if it had a sign saying
government was not endorsing the religion.
Justice Clarence Thomas, the only black member
of the court, wrote a separate opinion saying he didn't
believe for a minute that the KKK was using the cross
to celebrate Christmas. "The Klan simply has
appropriated one of the most sacred of religious
symbols as a symbol of hate," he wrote. But even if
the Klan's message was political rather than religious,
he concluded, free speech should be allowed in an
established public forum like Ohio's Capitol Square.
The 10-foot cross stood for one day before
vandals tore it down.
The Virginia case more deeply divided the court.
The university in Charlottesville, which the court
noted was one of Thomas Jefferson's proudest
achievements, refused to pay the printing costs of a
student magazine called Wide Awake: A Christian
Perspective at the University of Virginia. Editor
Ronald Rosenberger said his religious rights were
violated, especially because the school funneled
student activity fees to more than 100 other groups,
including Jewish and Muslim publications.
Five justices agreed with Rosenberger. Four
dissenters were horrified.
"The court today, for the first time, approves
direct funding of core religious activities by an arm of
the state," wrote Souter, joined by Justices John Paul
Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
But in this case, the majority argued, the
university would have paid the printer, not a religious
group, and benefit to religion would be "incidental."
"They certainly leave the door wide open for
things like (school) vouchers and other forms of state
support for religion," said Elliot Mincberg, executive
vice president and legal director of People for the
American Way. "But it's very inportant to point out
that it only leaves the door open. It doesn't walk
through the door."
The court's decisions come at a time when the
religious right is complaining that government,
including the high court, is hostile to religion. At a
congressional field hearing in Tampa last week,
children told of getting in trouble at school for reading
their Bibles or drawing pictures of Jesus.
Congress is considering a constitutional
amendment that would encourage organized school
prayer and public displays of religion. It also would
allow direct payments from government to religious
organizations, such as schools.
But religious freedom is not threatened, said
Mincberg.
"These decisions further show," he said, "there's
no reason to play political football with the First
Amendment out of a perception there's hostility going
around."
- Information from Reuter and Scripps Howard
News Service was used in this story.
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EXCERPTS FROM SUPREME COURT'S RULING ON RELIGIOUS MAGAZINE
(Including Excerpts From Ruling on Klan Cross Burning)
The New York Times
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
Friday, June 30, 1995
Following is an excerpt from the Supreme Court's
7-to-2 decision today that the Ku Klux Klan had a
free-speech right to erect a cross in a state-owned park
in Columbus, Ohio, that operated as a public forum,
open to varieties of private expression. The dissenting
Justices in the case, Capitol Square Review Board v.




Respondents' religious display in Capitol Square
was private expression. Our precedent establishes that
private religious speech, far from being a First
Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the
Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.
Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least,
government suppression of speech has so commonly
been directed precisely at religious speech that a
free-speech clause without religion would be "Hamlet"
without the prince. Accordingly, we have not excluded
from free-speech protections religious proselytizing,
or even acts of worship. Petitioners do not dispute that
respondents, in displaying their cross, were engaging
in constitutionally protected expression. They do
contend that the constitutional protection does not
extend to the length of permitting that expression to be
made on Capitol Square.
It is undeniable, of course, that speech which is
constitutionally protected against state suppression is
not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all
property owned by the State. The right to use
government property for one's private expression
depends upon whether the property has by law or
tradition been given the status of a public forum, or
rather has been reserved for specific official uses. If
the former, a State's right to limit protected expressive
activity is sharply circumscribed: it may impose
reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner
restrictions (a ban on all unattended displays, which
did not exist here, might be one such), but it may
regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is
necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling
state interest. These strict standards apply here, since
the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that
Capitol Square was a traditional public forum.
Petitioners do not claim that their denial of
respondents' application was based upon a
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. To
the contrary, they concede indeed it is the essence of
their case that the Board rejected the display precisely
because its content was religious. Petitioners advance
a single justification for closing Capitol Square to
respondents' cross: the State's interest in avoiding
official endorsement of Christianity, as required by the
Establishment Clause....
There is no doubt that compliance with the
Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently
compelling to justify content-based restrictions on
speech. Whether that interest is implicated here,
however, is a different question. And we do not write
on a blank slate in answering it. We have twice
previously addressed the combination of private
religious expression, a forum available for public use,
content-based regulation, and a State's interest in
complying with the Establishment Clause. Both times,
we have struck down the restriction on religious
content.
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Ronald W. ROSENBERGER, et al., Petitioners
V.
RECTOR AND VISITORS OF the UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA et al.
No. 94-329.
115 S.Ct. 2510
Argued March 1, 1995.
Decided June 29, 1995.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The University of Virginia, an instrumentality of
the Commonwealth for which it is named and thus
bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
authorizes the payment of outside contractors for the
printing costs of a variety of student publications. It
withheld any authorization for payments on behalf of
petitioners for the sole reason that their student paper
"primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f|
in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." That the
paper did promote or manifest views within the
defined exclusion seems plain enough. The challenge
is to the University's regulation and its denial of
authorization, the case raising issues under the Speech
and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
I
Petitioners' organization, Wide Awake
Productions (WAP), qualified as a CIO [Contracted
Independent Organization]. Formed by petitioner
Ronald Rosenberger and other undergraduates in
1990, WAP was established "[t]o publish a magazine
of philosophical and religious expression," "[t]o
facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of
sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,"
and "[t]o provide a unifying focus for Christians of
multicultural backgrounds." WAP publishes Wide
Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of
Virginia. The paper's Christian viewpoint was evident
from the first issue, in which its editors wrote that the
journal "offers a Christian perspective on both
personal and community issues, especially those
relevant to college students at the University of
Virginia-H The editors committed the paper to a two-
fold mission: "to challenge Christians to live, in word
and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to
encourage students to consider what a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ means." The first issue
had articles about racism, crisis pregnancy, stress,
prayer, C.S. Lewis' ideas about evil and free will, and
reviews of religious music. In the next two issues,
Wide Awake featured stories about homosexuality,
Christian missionary work, and eating disorders, as
well as music reviews and interviews with University
professors. Each page of Wide Awake, and the end of
each article or review, is marked by a cross. The
advertisements carried in Wide Awake also reveal the
Christian perspective of the journal. For the most
part, the advertisers are churches, centers for Christian
study, or Christian bookstores. By June 1992, WAP
had distributed about 5,000 copies of Wide Awake to
University students, free of charge.
WAP had acquired CIO status soon after it was
organized. This is an important consideration in this
case, for had it been a "religious organization," WAP
would not have been accorded CIO status. As defined
by the Guidelines, a "religious organization" is "an
organization whose purpose is to practice a devotion
to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity." At no
stage in this controversy has the University contended
that WAP is such an organization.
A few months after being given CIO status, WAP
requested the SAF [Student Activities Fund] to pay its
printer $5,862 for the costs of printing its newspaper.
The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council
denied WAP's request on the ground that Wide Awake
was a "religious activity" within the meaning of the
Guidelines, i.e., that the newspaper "promote[d] or
manifestled] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or
an ultimate reality." It made its determination after
examining the first issue. WAP appealed the denial to
the full Student Council, contending that WAP met all
the applicable Guidelines and that denial of SAF
support on the basis of the magazine's religious
perspective violated the Constitution. The appeal was
denied without further comment, and WAP appealed
to the next level, the Student Activities Committee. In
a letter signed by the Dean of Students, the committee
sustained the denial of funding.
II
It is axiomatic that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys. Other principles follow from this
precept. In the realm of private speech or expression,
government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another. Discrimination against speech because of its
message is presumed to be unconstitutional. These
rules informed our determination that the government
offends the First Amendment when it imposes
financial burdens on certain speakers based on the
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content of their expression. When the government
targets not subject matter but particular views taken
by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content
discrimination. The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker
is the rationale for the restriction.
These principles provide the framework
forbidding the State from exercising viewpoint
discrimination, even when the limited public forum is
one of its own creation. In a case involving a school
district's provision of school facilities for private uses,
we declared that "[tihere is no question that the
District, like the private owner of property, may
legally preserve the property under its control for the
use to which it is dedicated." The necessities of
confining a forum to the limited and legitimate
purposes for which it was created may justify the State
in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion
of certain topics. Once it has opened a limited forum,
however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries
it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech
where its distinction is not "reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum," nor may it discriminate
against speech on the basis of its viewpoint. Thus, in
determining whether the State is acting to preserve the
limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion
of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a
distinction between, on the one hand, content
discrimination, which may be permissible if it
preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on
the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations.
The University does acknowledge (as it must in
light of our precedents) that "ideologically driven
attempts to suppress a particular point of view are
presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other
contexts," but insists that this case does not present
that issue because the Guidelines draw lines based on
content, not viewpoint. As we have noted,
discrimination against one set of views or ideas is but
a subset or particular instance of the more general
phenomenon of content discrimination. And, it must
be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise one.
It is, in a sense, something of an understatement to
speak of religious thought and discussion as just a
viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of
thought. The nature of our origins and destiny and
their dependence upon the existence of a divine being
have been subjects of philosophic inquiry throughout
human history. We conclude, nonetheless, that here,
as in Lamb's Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the
proper way to interpret the University's objections to
Wide Awake. By the very terms of the SAF
prohibition, the University does not exclude religion
as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment
those student journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of
inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific
premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.
The prohibited perspective, not the general subject
matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party
payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise
within the approved category of publications.
The distinction between the University's own
favored message and the private speech of students is
evident in the case before us. The University itself has
taken steps to ensure the distinction in the agreement
each CIO must sign. The University declares that the
student groups eligible for SAF support are not the
University's agents, are not subject to its control, and
are not its responsibility. Having offered to pay the
third- party contractors on behalf of private speakers
who convey their own messages, the University may
not silence the expression of selected viewpoints.
The University urges that, from a constitutional
standpoint, funding of speech differs from provision
of access to facilities because money is scarce and
physical facilities are not. Beyond the fact that in any
given case this proposition might not be true as an
empirical matter, the underlying premise that the
University could discriminate based on viewpoint if
demand for space exceeded its availability is wrong as
well. The government cannot justify viewpoint
discrimination among private speakers on the
economic fact of scarcity. Had the meeting rooms in
Lamb's Chapel been scarce, had the demand been
greater than the supply, our decision would have been
no different. It would have been incumbent on the
State, of course, to ration or allocate the scarce
resources on some acceptable neutral principle; but
nothing in our decision indicated that scarcity would
give the State the right to exercise viewpoint
discrimination that is otherwise impermissible.
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at
stake here. The first danger to liberty lies in granting
the State the power to examine publications to
determine whether or not they are based on some
ultimate idea and if so for the State to classify them.
The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from
the chilling of individual thought and expression.
That danger is especially real in the University setting,
where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the
center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition. In
ancient Athens, and, as Europe entered into a new
period of intellectual awakening, in places like
Bologna, Oxford, and Paris, universities began as
voluntary and spontaneous assemblages or concourses
for students to speak and to write and to learn. The
quality and creative power of student intellectual life
to this day remains a vital measure of a school's
influence and attainment. For the University, by
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regulation, to cast disapproval on particular
viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free
speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers
for the nation's intellectual life, its college and
university campuses.
The Guideline invoked by the University to deny
third-party contractor payments on behalf of WAP
effects a sweeping restriction on student thought and
student inquiry in the context of University sponsored
publications. The prohibition on funding on behalf of
publications that "primarily promot[e] or manifes[t] a
particular belie[f) in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality," in its ordinary and commonsense meaning,
has a vast potential reach. The term "promotes" as
used here would comprehend any writing advocating
a philosophic position that rests upon a belief in a
deity or ultimate reality. And the term "manifests"
would bring within the scope of the prohibition any
writing that is explicable as resting upon a premise
which presupposes the existence of a deity or ultimate
reality. Were the prohibition applied with much vigor
at all, it would bar funding of essays by hypothetical
student contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and
Descartes. And if the regulation covers, as the
University says it does, those student journalistic
efforts which primarily manifest or promote a belief
that there is no deity and no ultimate reality, then
under-graduates named Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell,
and Jean-Paul Sartre would likewise have some of
their major essays excluded from student publications.
If any manifestation of beliefs in first principles
disqualifies the writing, as seems to be the case, it is
indeed difficult to name renowned thinkers whose
writings would be accepted, save perhaps for articles
disclaiming all connection to their ultimate
philosophy. Plato could contrive perhaps to submit an
acceptable essay on making pasta or peanut butter
cookies, provided he did not point out their
(necessary) imperfections.
Based on the principles we have discussed, we
hold that the regulation invoked to deny SAF support,
both in its terms and in its application to these
petitioners, is a denial of their right of free speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. It remains to be
considered whether the violation following from the
University's action is excused by the necessity of
complying with the Constitution's prohibition against
state establishment of religion. We turn to that
question.
III
Before its brief on the merits in this Court, the
University had argued at all stages of the litigation
that inclusion of WAP's contractors in SAF funding
authorization would violate the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, that is the ground on which the University
prevailed in the Court of Appeals. We granted
certiorari on this question: "Whether the
Establishment Clause compels a state university to
exclude an otherwise eligible student publication from
participation in the student activities fund, solely on
the basis of its religious viewpoint, where such
exclusion would violate the Speech and Press Clauses
if the viewpoint of the publication were
nonreligious."The University now seems to have
abandoned this position, contending that "[tihe
fundamental objection to petitioners' argument is not
that it implicates the Establishment Clause but that it
would defeat the ability of public education at all
levels to control the use of public funds." That the
University itself no longer presses the Establishment
Clause claim is some indication that it lacks force;
but as the Court of Appeals rested its judgment on the
point and our dissenting colleagues would find it
determinative, it must be addressed.
If there is to be assurance that the Establishment
Clause retains its force in guarding against those
governmental actions it was intended to prohibit, we
must in each case inquire first into the purpose and
object of the governmental action in question and then
into the practical details of the program's operation.
Before turning to these matters, however, we can set
forth certain general principles that must bear upon
our determination.
The governmental program here is neutral toward
religion. There is no suggestion that the University
created it to advance religion or adopted some
ingenious device with the purpose of aiding a
religious cause. The object of the SAF is to open a
forum for speech and to support various student
enterprises, including the publication of newspapers,
in recognition of the diversity and creativity of student
life. The University's SAF Guidelines have a separate
classification for, and do not make third-party
payments on behalf of, "religious organizations,"
which are those "whose purpose is to practice a
devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity."
The category of support here is for "student news,
information. opinion, entertainment, or academic
communications media groups," of which Wide
Awake was 1 of 15 in the 1990 school year. WAP
did not seek a subsidy because of its Christian
editorial viewpoint; it sought funding as a student
journal, which it was.
Government neutrality is apparent in the State's
overall scheme in a further meaningful respect. The
program respects the critical difference "between
government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect." In this case, "the
government has not willfully fostered or encouraged"
any mistaken impression that the student newspapers
speak for the University. The University has taken
pains to disassociate itself from the private speech
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involved in this case. The Court of Appeals' apparent
concern that Wide Awake's religious orientation
would be attributed to the University is not a plausible
fear, and there is no real likelihood that the speech in
question is being either endorsed or coerced by the
State.
It does not violate the Establishment Clause for
a public university to grant access to its facilities on a
religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student
groups, including groups which use meeting rooms for
sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional
exercises. This is so even where the upkeep,
maintenance, and repair of the facilities attributed to
those uses is paid from a student activities fund to
which students are required to contribute. The
government usually acts by spending money. Even the
provision of a meeting room, as in Mergens and
Widmar, involved governmental expenditure, if only
in the form of electricity and heating or cooling costs.
The error made by the Court of Appeals, as well as by
the dissent, lies in focusing on the money that is
undoubtedly expended by the government, rather than
on the nature of the benefit received by the recipient.
If the expenditure of governmental funds is prohibited
whenever those funds pay for a service that is,
pursuant to a religion-neutral program, used by a
group for sectarian purposes, then Widmar, Mergens,
and Lamb's Chapel would have to be overruled.
Given our holdings in these cases, it follows that a
public university may maintain its own computer
facility and give student groups access to that facility,
including the use of the printers, on a religion neutral,
say first-come-first-served, basis. If a religious
student organization obtained access on that
religion-neutral basis and used a computer to compose
or a printer or copy machine to print speech with a
religious content or viewpoint, the State's action in
providing the group with access would no more
violate the Establishment Clause than would giving
those groups access to an assembly hall. There is no
difference in logic or principle, and no difference of
constitutional significance, between a school using its
funds to operate a facility to which students have
access, and a school paying a third-party contractor to
operate the facility on its behalf. The latter occurs
here. The University provides printing services to a
broad spectrum of student newspapers qualified as
CIOs by reason of their officers and membership.
Any benefit to religion is incidental to the
governments provision of secular services for secular
purposes on a religion-neutral basis. Printing is a
routine, secular, and recurring attribute of student life.
By paying outside printers, the University in fact
attains a further degree of separation from the student
publication, for it avoids the duties of supervision,
escapes the costs of upkeep, repair, and replacement
attributable to student use, and has a clear record of
costs. As a result, and as in Widmar, the University
can charge the SAF, and not the taxpayers as a whole,
for the discrete activity in question. It would be
formalistic for us to say that the University must
forfeit these advantages and provide the services itself
in order to comply with the Establishment Clause. It
is, of course, true that if the State pays a church's bills
it is subsidizing it, and we must guard against this
abuse. That is not a danger here, based on the
considerations we have advanced and for the
additional reason that the student publication is not a
religious institution, at least in the usual sense of that
term as used in our case law, and it is not a religious
organization as used in the University's own
regulations. It is instead a publication involved in a
pure forum for the expression of ideas, ideas that
would be both incomplete and chilled were the
Constitution to be interpreted to require that state
officials and courts scan the publication to ferret out
views that principally manifest a belief in a divine
being.
Were the dissent's view to become law, it would
require the University, in order to avoid a
constitutional violation, to scrutinize the content of
student speech, lest the expression in question--speech
otherwise protected by the Constitution--contain too
great a religious content. The dissent, in fact,
anticipates such censorship as "crucial" in
distinguishing between "works characterized by the
evangelism of Wide Awake and writing that merely
happens to express views that a given religion might
approve." That eventuality raises the specter of
governmental censorship, to ensure that all student
writings and publications meet some baseline standard
of secular orthodoxy. To impose that standard on
student speech at a university is to imperil the very
sources of free speech and expression....
To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not
necessary for the University to deny eligibility to
student publications because of their viewpoint. The
neutrality commanded of the State by the separate
Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by
the University's course of action. The viewpoint
discrimination inherent in the University's regulation
required public officials to scan and interpret student
publications to discern their underlying philosophic
assumptions respecting religious theory and belief.
That course of action was a denial of the right of free
speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or
hostility to religion, which could undermine the very
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. There is
no Establishment Clause violation in the University's
honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be,
and is, reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice O'CONNOR, concurring.
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This case lies at the intersection of the principle
of government neutrality and the prohibition on state
funding of religious activities. It is clear that the
University has established a generally applicable
program to encourage the free exchange of ideas by its
students, an expressive marketplace that includes
some 15 student publications with predictably
divergent viewpoints. It is equally clear that
petitioners' viewpoint is religious and that publication
of Wide Awake is a religious activity, under both the
University's regulation and a fair reading of our
precedents. Not to finance Wide Awake, according to
petitioners, violates the principle of neutrality by
sending a message of hostility toward religion. To
finance Wide Awake, argues the University, violates
the prohibition on direct state funding of religious
activities.
When two bedrock principles so conflict,
understandably neither can provide the definitive
answer. Reliance on categorical platitudes is
unavailing. Resolution instead depends on the hard
task of judging--sifting through the details and
determining whether the challenged program offends
the Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires
courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on
the particular facts of each case. As Justice Holmes
observed in a different context: "Neither are we
troubled by the question where to draw the line. That
is the question in pretty much everything worth
arguing in the law. Day and night, youth and age are
only types."
So it is in this case. The nature of the dispute
does not admit of categorical answers, nor should any
be inferred from the Court's decision today. Instead,
certain considerations specific to the program at issue
lead me to conclude that by providing the same
assistance to Wide Awake that it does to other
publications, the University would not be endorsing
the magazine's religious perspective.
First, the student organizations, at the University's
insistence, remain strictly independent of the
University....
Second, financial assistance is distributed in a
manner that ensures its use only for permissible
purposes. A student organization seeking assistance
must submit disbursement requests; if approved, the
funds are paid directly to the third-party vendor and do
not pass through the organization's coffers. This
safeguard accompanying the University's financial
assistance, when provided to a publication with a
religious viewpoint such as Wide Awake, ensures that
the funds are used only to further the University's
purpose in maintaining a free and robust marketplace
of ideas, from whatever perspective. This feature also
makes this case analogous to a school providing equal
access to a generally available printing press (or other
physical facilities), and unlike a block grant to
religious organizations.
Third, assistance is provided to the religious
publication in a context that makes improbable any
perception of government endorsement of the religious
message. Wide Awake does not exist in a vacuum. It
competes with 15 other magazines and newspapers for
advertising and readership. The widely divergent
viewpoints of these many purveyors of opinion, all
supported on an equal basis by the University,
significantly diminishes the danger that the message of
any one publication is perceived as endorsed by the
University. Besides the general news publications, for
example, the University has provided support to The
Yellow Journal, a humor magazine that has targeted
Christianity as a subject of satire, and Al-Salam, a
publication to "promote a better understanding of
Islam to the University Community." Given this wide
array of non-religious, anti-religious and competing
religious viewpoints in the forum supported by the
University, any perception that the University
endorses one particular viewpoint would be illogical.
This is not the harder case where religious speech
threatens to dominate the forum.
Finally, although the question is not presented
here, I note the possibility that the student fee is
susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an
objecting student that she should not be compelled to
pay for speech with which she disagrees. There
currently exists a split in the lower courts as to
whether such a challenge would be successful. While
the Court does not resolve the question here, the
existence of such an opt-out possibility not available
to citizens generally, provides a potential basis for
distinguishing proceeds of the student fees in this case
from proceeds of the general assessments in support of
religion that lie at the core of the prohibition against
religious funding, and from government funds
generally. Unlike monies dispensed from state or
federal treasuries, the Student Activities Fund is
collected from students who themselves administer the
fund and select qualifring recipients only from among
those who originally paid the fee. The government
neither pays into nor draws from this common pool,
and a fee of this sort appears conducive to granting
individual students proportional refunds. The Student
Activities Fund, then, represents not government
resources, whether derived from tax revenue, sales of
assets, or otherwise, but a fund that simply belongs to
the students.
The Court's decision today therefore neither
trumpets the supremacy of the neutrality principle nor
signals the demise of the funding prohibition in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As I observed
last Term, "[e]xperience proves that the Establishment
Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be
reduced to a single test." When bedrock principles
collide, they test the limits of categorical obstinacy
and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand Unified
Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor
unified. The Court today does only what courts must
do in many Establishment Clause cases--focus on
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specific features of a particular government action to
ensure that it does not violate the Constitution. By
withholding from Wide Awake assistance that the
University provides generally to all other student
publications, the University has discriminated on the
basis of the magazine's religious viewpoint in
violation of the Free Speech Clause. And particular
features of the University's program--such as the
explicit disclaimer, the disbursement of funds directly
to third-party vendors, the vigorous nature of the
forum at issue, and the possibility for objecting
students to opt out-convince me that providing such
assistance in this case would not carry the danger of
impermissible use of public funds to endorse Wide
Awake's religious message.
Subject to these comments, I join the opinion of
the Court.
Justice THOMAS concurring. [Omitted]
Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice STEVENS,
Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join,
dissenting.
The Court today, for the first time, approves
direct funding of core religious activities by an arm of
the State. It does so, however, only after erroneous
treatment of some familiar principles of law
implementing the First Amendment's Establishment
and Speech.Clauses, and by viewing the very funds in
question as beyond the reach of the Establishment
Clause's funding restrictions as such. Because there
is no wan-ant for distinguishing among public funding
sources for purposes of applying the First
Amendment's prohibition of religious establishment,
I would hold that the University's refusal to support
petitioners' religious activities is compelled by the
Establishment Clause. I would therefore affirm.
I
The central question in this case is whether a
grant from the Student Activities Fund to pay Wide
Awake's printing expenses would violate the
Establishment Clause. Although the Court does not
dwell on the details of Wide Awake's message, it
recognizes something sufficiently religious in the
publication to demand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
Although the Court places great stress on the
eligibility of secular as well as religious activities for
grants from the Student Activities Fund, it recognizes
that such evenhanded availability is not by itself
enough to satisfy constitutional requirements for any
aid scheme that results in a benefit to religion.
Something more is necessary to justify any religious
aid. Some members of the Court, at least, may think
the funding permissible on a view that it is indirect,
since the money goes to Wide Awake's printer, not
through Wide Awake's own checking account. The
Court's principal reliance, however, is on an argument
that providing religion with economically valuable
services is permissible on the theory that services are
economically indistinguishable from religious access
to governmental speech forums, which sometimes is
permissible. But this reasoning would commit the
Court to approving direct religious aid beyond
anything justifiable for the sake of access to speaking
forums. The Court implicitly recognizes this in its
further attempt to circumvent the clear bar to direct
governmental aid to religion. Different members of
the Court seek to avoid this bar in different ways. The
opinion of the Court makes the novel assumption that
only direct aid financed with tax revenue is barred,
and draws the erroneous conclusion that the
involuntary Student Activities Fee is not a tax. I do
not read Justice O'CONNOR'S opinion as sharing that
assumption; she places this Student Activities Fund
in a category of student funding enterprises from
which religious activities in public universities may
benefit, so long as there is no consequent endorsement
of religion. The resulting decision is in unmistakable
tension with the accepted law that the Court continues
to avow.
A
Using public funds for the direct subsidization of
preaching the word is categorically forbidden under
the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was
meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar
this use of public money. Evidence on the subject
antedates even the Bill of Rights itself, as may be seen
in the writings of Madison, whose authority on
questions about the meaning of the Establishment
Clause is well settled. Four years before the First
Congress proposed the First Amendment, Madison
gave his opinion on the legitimacy of using public
funds for religious purposes, in the Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which
played the central role in ensuring the defeat of the
Virginia tax assessment bill in 1786 and framed the
debate upon which the Religion Clauses stand: "Who
does not see that ... the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his
property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all
cases whatsoever?"
The principle against direct funding with public
money is patently violated by the contested use of
today's student activity fee. Like today's taxes
generally, the fee is Madison's threepence. The
University exercises the power of the State to compel
a student to pay it, see Jefferson's Preamble, supra,
and the use of any part of it for the direct support of
religious activity thus strikes at what we have
repeatedly held to be the heart of the prohibition on
establishment.
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The Court, accordingly, has never before upheld
direct state funding of the sort of proselytizing
published in Wide Awake and, in fact, has
categorically condemned state programs directly
aiding religious activity.
Even when the Court has upheld aid to an
institution performing both secular and sectarian
functions, it has always made a searching enquiry to
ensure that the institution kept the secular activities
separate from its sectarian ones, with any direct aid
flowing only to the former and never the latter.
Reasonable minds may differ over whether the
Court reached the correct result in each of these cases,
but their common principle has never been questioned
or repudiated. "Although Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the
Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed
. . . indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular
religious faith."
B
The Court's claim of support from these
forum-access cases is ruled out by the very scope of
their holdings. While they do indeed allow a limited
benefit to religious speakers, they rest on the
recognition that all speakers are entitled to use the
street corner (even.though the State paves the roads
and provides police protection to everyone on the
street) and on the analogy between the public street
corner and open classroom space. Thus, the Court
found it significant that the classroom speakers would
engage in traditional speech activities in these forums,
too, even though the rooms (like street corners)
require some incidental state spending to maintain
them. The analogy breaks down entirely, however, if
the cases are read more broadly than the Court wrote
them, to cover more than forums for literal speaking.
There is no traditional street corner printing provided
by the government on equal terms to all comers, and
the forum cases cannot be lifted to a higher plane of
generalization without admitting that new economic
benefits are being extended directly to religion in clear
violation of the principle barring direct aid. The
argument from economic equivalence thus breaks
down on recognizing that the direct state aid it would
support is not mitigated by the street corner analogy in
the service of free speech. Absent that, the rule
against direct aid stands as a bar to printing services
as well as printers.
The issue whether a distinction is based on
viewpoint does not turn simply on whether a
government regulation happens to be applied to a
speaker who seeks to advance a particular viewpoint;
the issue, of course, turns on whether the burden on
speech is explained by reference to viewpoint. As
when deciding whether a speech restriction is
content-based or content-neutral, "[tihe government's
purpose is the controlling consideration." So, for
example, a city that enforces its excessive noise
ordinance by pulling the plug on a rock band using a
forbidden amplification system is not guilty of
viewpoint discrimination simply because the band
wishes to use that equipment to espouse antiracist
views. Nor does a municipality's decision to prohibit
political advertising on bus placards amount to
viewpoint discrimination when in the course of
applying this policy it denies space to a person who
wishes to speak in favor of a particular political
candidate.
Accordingly, the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination serves that important purpose of the
Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government
from skewing public debate. Other things being
equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when
government allows one message while prohibiting the
messages of those who can reasonably be expected to
respond. It is precisely this element of taking sides in
a public debate that identifies viewpoint
discrimination and makes it the most pernicious of all
distinctions based on content. Thus, if government
assists those espousing one point of view, neutrality
requires it to assist those espousing opposing points
of view, as well.
There is no viewpoint discrimination in the
University's application of its Guidelines to deny
funding to Wide Awake. Under those Guidelines, a
"religious activit[y]," which is not eligible for funding
is "an activity which primarily promotes or manifests
a particular belief(s) in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality." It is clear that this is the basis on which
Wide Awake Productions was denied funding. The
discussion of Wide Awake's content shows beyond
any question that it "primarily promotes or manifests
a particular belief(s) in or about a deity . . .," in the
very specific sense that its manifest function is to call
students to repentance, to commitment to Jesus Christ,
and to particular moral action because of its Christian
character.
The Guidelines are thus substantially different
from the access restriction considered in Lamb's
Chapel, the case upon which the Court heavily relies
in finding a viewpoint distinction here. Lamb's
Chapel addressed a school board's regulation
prohibiting the after-hours use of school premises "by
any group for religious purposes," even though the
forum otherwise was open for a variety of social,
civic, and recreational purposes. "Religious" was
understood to refer to the viewpoint of a believer, and
the regulation did not purport to deny access to any
speaker wishing to express a non-religious or
expressly antireligious point of view on any subject.
With this understanding, it was unremarkable that
in Lamb's Chapel we unanimously determined that the
access restriction, as applied to a speaker wishing to
discuss family values from a Christian perspective,
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impermissibly distinguished between speakers on the
basis of viewpoint. Equally obvious is the distinction
between that case and this one, where the regulation is
being applied, not to deny funding for those who
discuss issues in general from a religious viewpoint,
but to those engaged in promoting or opposing
religious conversion and religious observances as
such. If this amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the
Court has all but eviscerated the line between
viewpoint and content.
To put the point another way, the Court's decision
equating a categorical exclusion of both sides of the
religious debate with viewpoint discrimination
suggests the Court has concluded that primarily
religious and antireligious speech, grouped together,
always provides an opposing (and not merely a
related) viewpoint to any speech about any secular
topic. Thus, the Court's reasoning requires a
university that funds private publications about any
primarily nonreligious topic also to fund publications
primarily espousing adherence to or rejection of
religion. But a university's decision to fund a
magazine about racism, and not to fund publications
aimed at urging repentance before God does not skew
the debate either about racism or the desirability of
religious conversion. The Court's contrary holding
amounts to a significant reformulation of our
viewpoint discrimination precedents and will
significantly expand access to limited-access forums.
I
Since I cannot see the future I cannot tell whether
today's decision portends much more than making a
shambles out of student activity fees in public
colleges. Still, my apprehension is whetted by Chief
Justice Burger's warning in Lemon v. Kurtzman: "in
constitutional adjudication some steps, which when
taken were thought to approach 'the verge,' have
become the platform for yet further steps. A certain
momentum develops in constitutional theory and it
can be a 'downhill thrust' easily set in motion but
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Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in the majority
opinion, said U.Va. created "a sweeping restriction on
student thought and student inquiry" that "would risk
fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion."
Some religious groups hailed the ruling, together
with another decision Thursday permitting the Ku
Klux Klan to erect a cross at an Ohio park, for
expanding opportunities for public expressions of
faith.
"We have crossed a critical threshold in the fight
for religious liberty," said Jay Sekulow, chief counsel
for the American Center for Law and Justice in
Virginia Beach, which had filed briefs supporting
both the student magazine and the KKK. "The
message is clear: Religious speech or speakers must
be treated exactly the same way as any other group."
The center is a nonprofit legal group established
by Pat Robertson.
But Barry W. Lynn, executive director of
Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State, said the ruling amounts to government support
of religion: "When you have a public university
picking the pockets of some students to pay for the
evangelizing of other students, that's not free speech.
That's tyranny."
Sekulow said the U.Va. decision will "propel and
energize other religious liberty issues," such as the
fight for government vouchers for religious schools.
But other legal experts said it would have little
effect on the voucher issue, because the student fees
that raise money for student activities are not
comparable to taxes, which would subsidize the
vouchers. And, they said, courts might allow students
who don't agree with a campus group to simply
withhold some student fees, an option that isn't open
to taxpayers.
Most colleges, which have guidelines similar to
U.Va.'s, will be forced to change their rules for
collecting and distributing money to student
organizations, opening the door to demands from
many more groups, university officials said.
As a result, critics say, many student activities
could get shortchanged if too many groups claim a
piece of the pie. Or, even worse, colleges could drop
all funding of student organizations to avoid the
headache, they say.
"It has to do with budgets; it has nothing to do
with religion," said Sheldon Steinbach, general
counsel for the American Council on Education, a
college lobbying group in Washington that backed
U.Va. "There just isn't enough money."
For Ron Rosenberger, the student who took the
case to the Supreme Court, religion was the point.
He established the magazine "Wide Awake" in
1990 to enlighten a campus that he considered to be
dominated by secular and liberal viewpoints. The
magazine looked at issues ranging from racism to
eating disorders through a Christian lens.
In 1991, he applied for $5,862 in university funds
but was turned down because the magazine was
deemed a "religious activity." U.Va. bars funding to
political and religious groups, fraternities or
sororities.
The magazine closed for lack of money.
Rosenberger left campus in 1992 without completing
his degree, but he continued his fight in the courts.
This year, U.Va. students resurrected the magazine
without aid from the university.
Debate has mostly hinged on dueling
interpretations of the "establishment clause" of the
First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from
making laws "respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof "
Supporters of Rosenberger said the university
squelched his right to express his religious views.
Opponents, including U.Va., said a public college
could not give money to a religious group without
appearing to endorse that faith.
But the majority of justices dismissed the
university's interpretation of the First Amendment.
"To obey the establishment clause," Kennedy wrote,
"it was not necessary for the university to deny
eligibility to student publications because of their
viewpoint."
Joining him were Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. The dissenters
were Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens.
Souter, in his dissent, wrote: "The court today, for
the first time, approves direct funding of core religious
activities by an arm of the state."
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Souter, who cited numerous excerpts from the
magazine, said it amounted to sermons on salvation.
"Using public funds for the direct subsidization of
preaching the word is categorically forbidden under
the Establishment Clause," he wrote.
U.Va.'s president, John T. Casteen III, said
Thursday, "I think there's probably some
disappointment around here because a lot of people
think the court misapplied the law."
Casteen said the Board of Visitors would meet in
the fall to revise the funding guidelines. Board
members could elect to do anything from distributing
money to every student organization to shutting down
funding for all groups, though Casteen said he
doubted they would pursue that option.
Officials at Old Dominion University and the
College of William and Mary say they, too, will
rewrite their guidelines. Under their current rules, they
said, a publication such as "Wide Awake" would not
have been funded.
Elliot Mincberg, legal director of the People for
the American Way, said the ruling will create an
"anything goes" attitude toward funding student
organizations, whether they're the KKK or a sorority.
"These funds may be something that universities
become leery of in the future, because it will create a
lot of conflict."
But Michael McDonald, president of the Center
for Individual Rights, which represented Rosenberger,
said he doubted schools would drop funding for
activities altogether. "To deny benefits to everyone,"
he said, "is, to me, cutting off your nose to spite your
face."
Thomas Jefferson, who founded the university,
has been invoked by both sides throughout the case,
and Thursday was no different. Souter quoted
Jefferson in his dissent, and other university
supporters agreed with his reasoning.
"The whole idea behind Jefferson's Bill for the
Establishment of Religious Freedom and the First
Amendment is that religion should be strictly
voluntary, so people don't pay a mandatory fee to
support . . . religion at all," said Melissa Rogers,
associate general counsel for the Baptist Joint
Committee, a coalition of moderate Baptist
conferences that backed the university.
However, Jim Gilmore, the state attorney general,
declared: "Thomas Jefferson founded the University of
Virginia as a monument to vigorous debate and the
robust exchange of ideas. The University of Virginia
may now continue in that historic role." Though
Gilmore's office usually represents state-supported
colleges, he sided with Rosenberger in the case.
In Charlottesville, many students said they knew
little about the case. Julie Lichtenvoort, a graduate
student in psychology, said, "I'm just worried that a
trend will start that U.Va. will become predominantly
very religious."
But Joanna Steere, entering her senior year, said:
"I don't have a problem with it. All voices should have
an outlet."




Ralph Reed of the Christian Coalition, and
George Stephanopoulos, Adviser to the President
On School Prayer and the First Amendment
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MR. RUSSERT: And with us now, Ralph Reed
and George Stephanopoulos. Gentlemen, welcome.
MR. RUSSERT: One of the most important areas
is something called a religious equality amendment,
which, as I read it, would allow for prayer at
graduation exercises or athletic events, a creche or
menorah in town squares. How would you bring that
result about?
MR. REED: Well, I think what we want to do,
Tim, is obviously move through the legislative
process. I was on a conference call just a couple of
weeks ago with chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Henry Hyde. We know that we need to
have hearings on this, we need to hear from both
sides. I think what we're trying to redress is a
systematic marginalization of faith in the public
square. It's the kind of thing that Yale Law Professor
Stephen Carter talked about so eloquently in his book,
"The Culture of Disbelief."
We don't want to really go back to a day where
any child of any faith is required to say a prayer with
which they disagree that's been mandated by the
government. But if a group of high school seniors,
who are, after all, many of them, old enough to vote
and old enough to be drafted, if they decide that they
want to have a rabbi come in and give a non-sectanan
invocation at their high school graduation ceremony,
we don't believe that anyone should silence or
bludgeon those students into submission.
As the Supreme Court itself said in the Supreme
Court decision of Demoyne vs. Tinker School District,
a child does not lose or shed their First Amendment
right to freedom of expression when they enter the
school house gate. We also believe that this goes way
beyond voluntary school prayer. It goes to whether or
not the Ten Commandments can be posted in a public
building and so forth. We think an amendment or a
statute, preferably an amendment, will help rectify
what we think is 30 years of hostility towards faith in
the public square.
MR. RUSSERT: Now this would be a
constitutional amendment to the Constitution which
would help interpret the First Amendment?
MR. REED: No, it doesn't amend the First
Amendment. What it does is it overturns a Supreme
Court decision called Lemon vs. Kurtzman. And in
that decision in 1971, the Supreme Court established
a three-part test to determine whether or not an act by
the government violated the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution. The problem is that that three-part
test really makes no sense. It's confusing, it's been
applied in a very chaotic and inconsistent way. And as
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in a dissent in the Lee vs.
Weisman decision in 1992, he said that the Lemon
test is really like a ghoul from a late-night movie that
continues to rise from the dead even after being
stabbed, and it has been applied in a way that we
think is unfair.
For example, you can-a public facility can loan
a projection--a projector--a movie projector to a
private or parochial school, but it can't loan the films.
It can't loan textbooks, but it can loan buses that then
take those students to a public library. It doesn't really
make any sense. What we really want is something
very simple. We don't want government edicts, we
don't want government legislating religion, but if a
citizen or a student through private initiated speech
wants to make a religious statement, we don't think
they should be silenced.
MR. RUSSERT: You'll have public school
teachers and supervisors standing up and leading
religious activity, and that's the very thing that the
United States of America was supposed to be
established to avoid.
MR. REED: Well, that's just simply not true, and
I'm not sure how many of those people read the
document. We, in fact, make it very clear that we are
opposed to government-dictated prayer in compulsory
settings. But as I said, if you go back to the Lee vs.
Weisman decision where the Supreme Court said that
a rabbi invited in by the students couldn't give a
prayer at a high school graduation, even though we
open every day of Congress with prayer, even though
we open every session of the Supreme Court with
prayer, even though the Ten Commandments are
chiseled in marble over the heads of the Supreme
Court justices and President Clinton himself in a town
hall meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina, in April of
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last year, said that he disagreed with that statement
and he thinks prayer ought to be allowed as well. So
I'm hopeful that we can find something that will
secure the rights of the American people to the
freedom of speech without regard to its content while
at the same time avoiding what we all oppose, which
is a government edict or a government church.
MR. RUSSERT: If a group of students are
praying a Christian prayer. . .what should the Jewish
or Muslim students in class do at that particular time?
MR REED: Well, I think they have a number of
options. They could do what I would do, if it were a
rabbi giving a Jewish prayer or a Muslim cleric giving
a Muslim prayer. What I would do is bow my head
out of respect for the religious beliefs of that
individual. It's the same thing I do, Tim, when I pick
up the newspaper and I read something that I don't
agree with. I don't try to take away the right of that
newspaper to print that story, because it's their right
under the First Amendment. I do have a right to state
my disagreement with that view, and they would be
free to do that. They would also be free not attend the
non-compulsory event at which that takes place.
Again, as President Clinton, himself, said in
referencing high school graduations, he said no one is
required to come to an event like that. And I think
what we ought to do--what we want to avoid really,
very simply, is what happened in the Engel vs. Vitale
and Schemp vs. Abington School District cases where
you had the New York State School Board write a
prayer. This was a government prayer. Teachers read
that prayer and every student had to listen to it. We're
not advocating that. But if a group of students says,
"We'd like to have prayer," we don't think they should
be denied that right. We think it's their right under the
Constitution.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Stephanopoulos, would the
administration support such a constitutional
amendment?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: I don't think so,
Tim, because you can't tell what the unintended
consequences of a constitutional amendment are. Let's
go back to first principles. As you pointed out, the
First Amendment has protected religion in this country
for over 200 years. We've become one of the most
religious countries in the world with great diversity
and great religious faith because the First Amendment
devised by Thomas Jefferson protected religion and
protected the state. It kept the spheres separate. We're
not trying to keep religion out of public life. As Ralph
has said, the president believes that people of
religious faith have a right and a responsibility to
make their views known, and he does agree. He sees
no problem with having religious prayers at certain
graduation ceremonies.
The problem with a constitutional amendment is
that it would probably strike the wrong balance, and
there would be no way to prevent a broader reach. For
example, the problem with the classroom: What we
want to avoid more than anything else is coercion of
conscience in the classroom. If a student got up and
prayed while all the other students there are sitting
there, there is an element of coercion, and that's what
we have to avoid time and time again.
MR. RUSSERT: But President Clinton in
Charlotte, as Mr. Reed pointed out, said--let me quote
this. He said, "You can't have a prayer at the
graduation exercise. I don't agree with that, because if
you're praying at a graduation exercise or a sporting
event, it's a big open-air thing. People should be able
to freely pray and to acknowledge God. We have
chaplains in the House and Senate."
If you don't want a constitutional amendment,
then how do you address the Supreme Court's--or how
do you overturn the Supreme Court's decision--would
say that the kind of thing the president wants to be
allowed--praying at graduations and sporting events
and is not now allowed--how do you fix it?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, right now
there are conflicting decisions in the courts about this,
so the courts still have a ways to go on whether or not
it ultimately will be allowed, particularly in
student-led prayers, which is what Ralph is talking
about. In addition, the president has already taken
steps to make sure that the bar against religious
expression in public life is lowered. The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which he signed and was
supported by religious groups from across the political
spectrum a year and a half ago, makes clear that we
want to allow religion, people of religious faith to
make their views known.
What we also have to do, I think, is make very,
very clear what is already allowed under the law. You
know, there's an awful lot of confusion across the
country about what is and what isn't allowed in school
districts. For example, most people don't know that
students are allowed to pray in cafeterias. There is
absolutely nothing to prevent students from getting
together in groups and praying. There's nothing to
prevent a student from expressing his religious views
in class. There's nothing to prevent students from
gathering before school starts out at the flagpole and
having prayer. And we are trying right now to make
sure that every school district and every principal
knows what is currently allowed under the law so that
people aren't acting under a misconception about what
is in the law.
In fact, what I would say before you go to the
extraordinary step of overturning the First
Amendment, which has really protected religion for so
long in this country, we would invite the Christian
Coalition to join the Clinton administration and other
religious groups from across the country in a national
campaign to make sure that every school principal,
every teacher, every school superintendent knows
exactly what is permitted under the law right now.
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MR. RUSSERT: So we're clear, President
Clinton would be in favor of a prayer at a graduation
exercise at a public school, a prayer at a sporting
event at a public university, and he would be in favor
of a manger scene in a town public square?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: The president has
said that you can do that. In current--in some places
right now, you can have manger scenes and secular
demonstrations of some sort. The president has
publicly said he's for that. What he is against is
amending the Constitution. We cannot upset the
balance struck in the First Amendment.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Reed, do you want to
respond?
MR. REED: Well, I think--first of all, I welcome
the words, but the words have really got to be backed
by action, and the reality is that there is no ambiguity
whatsoever about the right of a rabbi or a priest or a
pastor to offer prayer at a high school graduation
ceremony. The Supreme Court has ruled that that is
unconstitutional. The only way to overturn that is to
either limit the jurisdiction of the courts, which has
never been done before on a First Amendment issue
and we would be against, or amending the
Constitution or passing some kind of a statute.
The second thing is, Tim, this goes way beyond
school prayer. This goes to the issue of the centrality
of faith in the social fabric. The Supreme Court has
also ruled that you can't post the Ten Commandments
in a public building, either a courthouse, a school,
anywhere. The Supreme Court has also ruled that a
school district that corresponds to the boundaries of a
largely Jewish community in-outside of New York,
the Kiryas Joel School District, is unconstitutional
ipso facto because it's a religious neighborhood.
What we're talking about here is not just school
prayer. We're talking about the rights of the American
people to express the faith that springs out of their
hearts and which is the vital part of our social fabric.
And I--although I agree with George, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was a good step; it's a baby
step. We've got to now take a giant leap forward and
guarantee the First Amendment rights of every citizen.
MR. RUSSERT: I'll give you the last word, Mr.
Stephanopoulos.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Again, the problem
when-once you move into the Constitution, you upset
the balance that has protected religion in this country
for so long. There's an Equal Access Act, which
guarantees that students and teachers also have the
right to express their views in the public square. We
have the protections right now. When you go in, when
you open up the Constitution, you're going to cross the
line from allowing free expression, from protecting
religion into coercion of conscience.
MS. IFILL:But here's my question. We're also
involved in politics in varying degrees. Is religion bad
for politics or is politics bad for religion?
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Oh, I think that
people of faith have to be involved in politics, that
people have a responsibility to go out and express
those views. What you have to make sure of, is that
when you do that, you also make room for everyone of
differing views to express those same opinions.
MR. REED: I agree with that. I think that Martin
Luther King probably said it best in 1954 when he
said that "a just law is a law; a man-made law, that
corresponds with the law of God and with the law of
nature." And I think what people of faith bring, Gwen,
to the debate is not something that is dangerous, it's
not intolerant, it's what has always made our nation
great. It's people trying to give something to
government rather than get something to government.
In this city, we've got an awful lot of lobbyists in
this town that are looking for tax breaks for
corporations, we've got unions looking for special
interest outlooks and so forth. People of faith,
uniquely, are not looking for anything for themselves,
they're looking for something that will enliven and
strengthen the culture and strengthen the family for
everybody and I think for that reason, they ought to be
welcome to the process, and not excluded.
MS. IFILL: Why is there so much nervousness
about the idea that they would be comingling of
politics and religion.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Because in the end,
what you have to be worried about is that when it's too
closely mingled with any purely partisan political
agenda, it's bad for the church, it's bad for people of
faith and it's bad for the polity. And that's what we
have to avoid. It tends to corrupt both the people
involved and the government when you get too closely
tied. The role of the church is to go out and enunciate
principles, to follow guideposts, to make sure that
their views are expressed. The problem is when you
get involved in the messy day-to-day compromises.
For instance, with the contract, you end up supporting
things you're against. Ralph--I believe it when he says
he's against abortion; he supported a contract that will
help promote it. That's a real problem. That's the
problem with the compromise.
MR. RUSSERT: Let me just close on this one
point. Mr. Reed, when you took the job as the
executive director of the coalition, you said something
that very much struck me. You said, "I honestly
believe that, in my lifetime, we will see a country once
again governed by Christians." Do you think that
President Clinton is a Christian leader?
MR. REED: Well, first of all, I don't think I
actually made that statement. That remark has been
attributed to me. What I want is to see people of faith
be able to serve in government and not excluded.
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You know, Tim, I've never felt it was my role to
sit in judgment of the personal faith commitments of
elected officials, or any other person, for that matter.
President Clinton's relationship with God is between
he and his maker, and it's appropriate not for me or
anybody else to sit in judgment of it. I think to the
extent that we have a dispute with this administration,
it is really based on policy. This is an administration
that ran promising a tax cut for middle-class families
with children. And now not only has it not fulfilled on
that pledge, but it is attacking those who are trying to
fulfill it. This is an administration that ran promising
to be a new kind of Democrat, and instead we got gays
in the military and Joycelyn Elders. So the dispute is
about policy. With regard to people's personal faith
commitments, I've never felt that should be on the
table. It's not an appropriate topic for public
discourse.
MR. RUSSERT: Do you think the president is
espousing Christian values in policy?
MR. REED: Well, I think, as I guess he said
when he was running for president, I think there is
always a danger of the bully pulpit being turned into
a pulpit of bull. I think there is a point at which you
can talk about things, and I applaud him for talking
about them. He gave a very eloquent speech yesterday
at the conference on character building, about the need
for moral values. I think the issue is, is that that
rhetoric and that talk needs to be backed up with
actions.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Please, two points.
Number one, on tax credit for families with children.
The president passed a tax cut for 15 million families
with children in his bill. The Republican contract
would overturn that tax cut and raise taxes. Number
two, I'm glad to hear Ralph talk about judge not lest
ye be judged. In his book, he suggests, somehow, that
President Clinton's faith is insincere. And if you
would take the opportunity to retract that statement
now, I think it would be good for everyone.
MR. REED: I didn't suggest that. It's not true.
I've never questioned the sincerity of his faith
commitment or any of the politicians. Let me
make...
MR. RUSSERT: I have to leave it there.
MR. REED: OK.
MR. RUSSERT: I'm sorry. Mr. Reed, Mr.
Stephanopoulos, thank you for a very interesting
morning. We hope you'll come back.
MR. REED: Thank you.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Thank you.
MR. RUSSERT: And we'll be right back with
William Safire.
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WHEN FAITH AND WORK COLLIDE
Defining Standards for Religious Harassment in the Workplace
Employee Relations Law Journal
Thursday, June 1, 1995
Dean J. Schaner, Melissa M. Erlemeier
From coverage of the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas
hearings to the movie Disclosure, the press and
popular culture have given extraordinary attention to
sexual harassment in the work-place. Other forms of
workplace harassment, however, are often overlooked,
including religious harassment. That changed in
October 1993. The EEOC proposed consolidated
guidelines covering work-place harassment based on
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, and
disability. The guidelines created a public uproar.
Religious conservatives harshly attacked the
guidelines, reasoning that the harassment standards, as
applied to religion, would force employers to create a
religion-free zone to avoid liability. Liberal groups
criticized the vague terminology in the guidelines,
expressing concern that the proposed harassment
standards would restrict religious free expression in
the workplace. Bowing to substantial political
pressure, the EEOC withdrew the guidelines and does
not plan to revise them. This article discusses
religious expression in the work-place and the public
outcry over the EEOC's proposed guidelines, analyzes
several cases interpreting religious discrimination and
harassment, and contends that the standards applied to
religious harassment should mirror the standards
applied by the courts in sexual harassment cases.
Tom works as an associate in the trust department
of a small bank. Based on his
Christian-fundamentalist upbringing, he believes that
the only way to obtain eternal life is through
self-denial and faith in Jesus Christ as his personal
savior. When Tom began work with the bank in 1990,
he did not believe that it was appropriate to
proselytize to his coworkers about his religious
beliefs. Things changed in 1994. Tom participated in
several local political elections, and his pastor advised
him that increased political action was necessary to
promote Christian religious values in an amoral,
secular society. In his quest to spread his
fundamentalist Christian beliefs, Tom told Dennis, a
Jewish coworker, that to obtain eternal life Dennis
must convert to Christianity and believe in Jesus
Christ as his personal savior. Initially, Dennis was not
offended, but Tom continued to discuss his Christian
beliefs with Dennis. Tom also placed numerous
religious objects on his desk, including a Bible, a
large picture of Jesus Christ, and a plaque containing
the phrase, "Jesus is the only way to eternal life."
Dennis listened to Tom proselytize about his
Christian beliefs for three weeks. When Tom
continued to preach at work, Dennis became offended
by Tom's discussions and the open display of religious
paraphernalia at Tom's desk. Dennis told Tom that he
was offended by the religious comments and wanted
it to stop. Tom did not stop. He believed that Dennis
was misinformed and tried to explain to Dennis that
Jesus Christ was the true savior. Because Tom did not
quit preaching, Dennis called the bank's human
resources department and reported that Tom's
religious conversations and objects offended him.
In view of these facts, the bank is faced with
several choices: (1) apply the bank's sexual
harassment policy and conduct an investigation to
determine whether Tom's conduct was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create an abusive working
environment; (2) do nothing and inform Dennis that
Tom has a right to freely voice his religious beliefs in
the workplace; (3) transfer Tom or Dennis to a
different department; or (4) explain to Tom and
Dennis that the bank is a religion-free zone and will
not tolerate any religious discussions during work
time, nor the display of any religious objects in the
workplace. Unfortunately, neither Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 nor the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) offers the bank any
significant guidance concerning the conflict between
Tom's desire to express his religious beliefs and
Dennis's desire that Tom stop espousing his beliefs in
the work-place.
Recently, the EEOC made an attempt to offer
guidance concerning workplace harassment, but
failed. On October 1, 1993, the Commission proposed
consolidated guidelines concerning unlawful
harassment in the work-place, including religious
harassment. The EEOC purported to apply the
existing guidelines for sex and national origin
harassment to other forms of harassment, such as race,
religion, age, and disability. However, the
Commission's proposed standards for restricting
harassment in the workplace created a massive public
outcry from religious groups and members of the U.S.
Congress who believed that the guidelines would chill
employee rights to exercise their religious beliefs
freely. Several conservative religious groups
vehemently attacked the guidelines as an illegitimate
attempt to create a religion-free zone in the workplace,
arguing that the guidelines would prohibit employees
who said "God bless you" or who wanted to wear a
cross or yarmulke at work. By contrast, several
religious liberals favored the guidelines in some form,believing that workers should be protected from
religious-based harassment. Indeed, mainline religious
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groups defended the guidelines, maintaining that the
terminology should be clarified, but not eliminated.
Succumbing to substantial political pressure, the
EEOC withdrew the guidelines and does not plan to
revise them.
In light of the Commission's decision to withdraw
the guidelines, this article analyzes religious
harassment issues in the workplace. Specifically, this
article: (1) discusses the potential conflicts between an
employee's interest in freely exercising religious
beliefs at work and an employers interest in restricting
religious harassment; (2) reviews several cases
addressing religious harassment issues; (3) analyzes
the EEOC's proposed guidelines on religious
harassment-, (4) contends that the Commission should
revise the guidelines to mirror existing sexual
harassment standards applied by the courts; and




As represented in the hypothetical, a devout
Christian may have an interest in discussing his
sincerely held religious beliefs with his coworkers, but
his employer, fearing Title VII liability, may have a
compelling interest in restricting speech and conduct
that have the potential for creating a hostile work
environment. Given Congress's reticence to address
the religious harassment issue, employers are placed
in a precarious position - they alone must determine,
without much guidance, whether religious
proselytizing and symbols (such as a cross, the Star of
David, or a yarmulke) represent conduct that is
offensive to others and creates an abusive work
environment. In light of the complex moral and
political issues underlying religious beliefs and
practices, the employer's task in defining religious
harassment is an arduous one.
Unfortunately, many employers have not
considered the real potential for religious harassment
in the workplace. They should. Since the workplace is
where people spend a significant part of their day, the
work environment offers a forum for employees to
express their opinions and ideas. They do not leave
their religious beliefs at home. In the past decade,
religion has played an expanding role in public life,
primarily because people turn to faith or the
transcendent as a source of love, hope or escape from
the complexities, despair, and anxiety involved in
day-to-day life. Also, the rise of the Religious Right
and Christian fundamentalism has added a political
dimension to the role of religion - one where the
church not only preaches faith or belief systems, but
also advocates religious-based, political activism.
Religious belief has been transformed from what was
traditionally a "private" matter to a powerful source of
political activism. Accordingly, religious harassment
is not an esoteric issue confined to the academic
world; it is a real-world issue that appears with
increasing frequency in reported cases.
As the American workforce diversifies to include
people with varied religious beliefs, potential conflicts
between an employer's interest in preventing religious
harassment and an employee's interest in freely
exercising religious beliefs will continue to grow. In
1993, for example, 16,000 harassment complaints
were filed with the EEOC, nearly 800 of which were
religious-related. In the sexual harassment context,
many employers have adopted antiharassment policies
because they are concerned with liability under state
and federal employment discrimination statutes and
common-law tort theories. These policies admonish
employees about possible legal consequences and
incorporate the harassment law standard, strongly
implying that employers are influenced by the fear of
liability. Employers that have been involved in
harassment litigation are more likely to implement
broad antiharassment policies to avoid future lawsuits.
Further, an employer's incentive to prohibit conduct
and speech that might constitute harassment has
increased based on the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which subjects employers to liability for emotional
distress and punitive damages.
To avoid liability, the prudent employer will
proscribe all speech and conduct that may constitute
harassment. The possibility of creating a "chilling
effect" from prohibiting speech and conduct that may
constitute harassment is outweighed by the risk of
significant liability.
Harassment law may restrict protected speech and
conduct, but the restrictions serve a compelling
interest - an equal work environment for employees
regardless of their race, sex, religion, age, disability,
or national origin. Thus, the employer is engaged in a
delicate balancing act, namely, weighing the
individual and societal value of protecting employees
from unlawful harassment against the value of free
expression that harassment law suppresses. Some
would argue that sex-based speech and conduct do not
deserve much protection, while religious speech and
conduct, as constitutionally protected activity, deserve
special protection from the reach of harassment law.
This article rejects that distinction, Contending that
any religious-based conduct that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create an abusive work environment is
subject to an employer's restrictions.
THE TITLE VII SCHEME
Under Title VII, an employer may not discharge
or otherwise discriminate against any individual
because of the individual's religion. Likewise, Title
VII prohibits an employer from limiting, segregating,
or classifying employees or applicants in a way that
would deprive them of any employment opportunities
or adversely affect their status as employees because
of their religion. Title VII also embodies an
employer's duty of accommodation. That duty requires
employers to reasonably accommodate an employee's
religious observance or practice unless "undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business" is
involved. At least in part because of the tension
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between Title VII's accommodation duty and the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
Supreme Court has broadly defined "undue hardship"
as any effect on business that is more than de minimis.
Courts have also established that an employer is not
required to accommodate one employee's religion by
measures that adversely affect another employee.
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,, the
Supreme Court explained that employees are not
entitled to a form of accommodation they prefer;
rather, all Title VII requires of an employer is that it
offer some form of accommodation, assuming that
could be done without undue hardship. Where an
employer has already reasonably accommodated the
employee's religious need, the statutory inquiry is at
an end. The employer need not further show that each
of the employee's alternative accommodations would
result in undue hardship. The cooperation of both the
employee and employer is needed in finding a
"reasonable accommodation that reconciles an
employee's religious practice or beliefs with the needs
of the employer's business." The "reasonable
accommodation" concept under Title VII defies
precise definition, and the statute offers no guidance
for determining the degree of accommodation that is
required of an employer. Despite this ambiguity, a
reasonable accommodation includes any
nondiscriminatory structure, procedure, policy, or
method that may be implemented within the
employment relationship and that permits an employee
to exercise religious beliefs or practices without
disrupting or conflicting with employment.
Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.,
vividly illustrates an employer's attempt to reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious observance - an
observance that coworkers found offensive. The
Wilson court addressed the question whether U.S.
West violated Title VII by terminating the
employment of Christine Wilson because she refused
to compromise her practice of wearing an antiabortion
button at work. After U.S. West downsized its
operations at several facilities, the company
transferred Wilson to its Cumming Street facility in
Omaha, Nebraska. U.S. West had no dress code at the
facility where employees, including Wilson, "could
wear whatever they wanted." As a Roman Catholic,
Wilson made a religious vow or promise to God in
July 1990 that she would wear a particular
antiabortion button "until there was an end to abortion
or until she would no longer fight the fight." She wore
the button at all times unless she was sleeping or
bathing. Measuring two inches in diameter, the button
had a color photograph of a fetus depicted at the
developmental stage between 18 and 20 weeks. The
photograph was surrounded by a black background,
and above the fetus' picture were the words "Stop
Abortion." In smaller letters and slightly above the
photograph were the words "They're Forgetting
Someone." Wilson believed that if she took off the
button, it would compromise her vow, and she would
lose her soul.
Wilson's coworkers found the button offensive
and asked her to stop wearing it. Explaining her
religious vow, Wilson refused to stop wearing the
button. The button continued to cause disruptions at
work. Rather than doing their jobs, employees
gathered and talked in the workplace. Also, a union
representative told a company supervisor that some
employees threatened to walk off their jobs because of
the button. For example, company witnesses testified
that some of Wilson's Catholic coworkers found the
button offensive, very disturbing, and stressful. As a
result of the coworker complaints, U.S. West offered
Wilson several options. She could: (1) wear the button
in her cubicle, but would be required to leave the
button in her cubicle when she left the cubicle and
moved around the office; (2) cover the button in some
manner; or (3) wear a different antiabortion button
with the same message, but without the photograph of
the fetus.
Analyzing Wilson's Title VII claim, the court
noted that a reasonable accommodation permitted the
employee to practice her religious beliefs or practices
without disrupting or conflicting with her
employment. Referencing well-established Title VII
principles, the court observed that any suggested
accommodation would cause an "undue hardship"
whenever it resulted in "more than a de minimis cost"
to the employer. The court rejected two of the
accommodations proposed by U.S. West. First, U.S.
West's offer that Wilson remove the button while she
circulated in the office was not a reasonable
accommodation of her religious belief because her
vow required her to wear the button except when she
slept or bathed. Second, U.S. West's option that
Wilson replace the button with another button was not
a reasonable accommodation because Wilson made
her vow in reference to the particular button she was
wearing. Replacing the button with a different button
without the picture of the fetus would not have
permitted Wilson to wear the button encompassed by
her vow. The substitute button accommodation did not
allow Wilson to exercise her sincerely held religious
practice at work.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that U.S. West
had reasonably accommodated Wilson's religious
observance by proposing that she, in some manner,
cover the button while at work. Wilson's vow required
her to wear the button - not to display the depicted
fetus prominently at all times. She could continue to
wear the button covered in some way, and this
alternative would avoid the turmoil involving her
coworkers. Finally, the court also determined that
other suggested accommodations would cause an
undue hardship to the conduct of the company's
business. The loss of efficiency and productivity, as
well as the expenditure of time and energy in attempts
to alleviate the acrimonious atmosphere at the facility,presented more than a de minimis cost to U.S. West.
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Similarly, transferring Wilson was not feasible
because transfers were governed by a specific policy
prescribed in a collective bargaining agreement
between U.S. West and the union, and circumventing
the procedures set forth in the agreement would have
compromised the rights of Wilson's coworkers. In
short, U.S. West had offered Wilson a reasonable
accommodation by allowing her to wear the button
with the fetus covered up and, in any event, the other
suggested accommodations would have caused undue
hardship to its business.
The Wilson decision exemplifies the tension
between an employer's attempt to accommodate an
employee's religious observance and coworker
complaints that the observance is repugnant. If the
employer does nothing about the complaints, it may be
liable for religious harassment under Title VII. At the
same time, the employer may accommodate an
employee's religious practice, yet face the wrath of
coworkers who believe that the employer has not done
enough to restrict what they consider to be a repugnant
religious practice. The Wilson decision also reveals
that the employer is faced with the delicate job of
juggling the employees' competing interests - the
freedom to practice a religious belief versus the
freedom from conduct that creates an abusive work
environment.
DEFINITION OF HARASSMENT
The concept of "harassment" adds yet another
complicating factor to the employer's balancing act.
Under Title VII and analogous state
antidiscrimination statutes, courts generally interpret
the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, race,
national origin, and religion to prohibit "harassment."
Harassment law has largely developed in the field of
sexual and racial harassment in the workplace. Sexual
harassment claims under Title VII have developed
under two distinct theories: "quid pro quo" and hostile
work environment claims. The quid pro quo theory
involves situations where an employee is forced to
chose between submission to sexual demands or the
loss of ioh henefits, promotions, or employment. The
employee suffers an adverse consequence because of
a superior's discriminatory behavior. The second and
more complex category of harassment claims involves
a hostile or offensive working environment.
In the sexual harassment setting, employees have
a right to work in an environment that is not sexually
hostile or offensive. Harassment by speech or
nonspeech conduct violates Title VII if it is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter die
conditions of [the victim's] employment and creates an
abusive working environment' because of the worker's
sex, race, religion or national origin." By contrast,
isolated and infrequent insults generally do not create
an abusive work environment, or the abuse may not be
severe enough to drive the employee from the job. In
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
recently affirmed that sexually discriminatory verbal
intimidation, ridicule, and insults may be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment that violates Title VII. The Court
reasoned that whether an environment is "hostile" or
"abusive" can be decided "only by looking at all the
circumstances . . . [such as] the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance."
CASE LAW ANALYSIS
Before the Supreme Court decided Harris, the
lower courts developed several analytic approaches to
determine whether an employee had stated an
actionable religious harassment claim. In several
cases, courts have applied well-established
discrimination principles in reviewing employment
decisions that are a mask for unlawful religious
discrimination. As harassment law has evolved, some
courts have applied legal standards used in the sexual
harassment context.
RELIGIOUS-BASED TESTS
Interpreting Title VII's prohibition of religious
discrimination in the workplace, courts have held that
employees may state actionable religious harassment
claims, especially when the employer applies religious
requirements that affect terms or conditions of
employment. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Blalock
v. Metals Trades, Inc. is instructive. There, Blalock
accepted employment with an openly Christian
company and received permission to "bear witness" to
clients. Blalock and the company's owner shared a
relationship with the spiritual leader of Metals Trades.
Shortly after he began work with Metals Trades,
Blalock and the company's spiritual leader disagreed
over religious matters, and their relationship soured.
The spiritual differences continued and, eventually,
Blalock was discharged. The Sixth Circuit reasoned
that Blalock's religious views differed from his
employer's, which was a factor in his discharge,
therefore stating an actionable claim under Title VII.
Referencing the Blalock court's analysis, a
Michigan federal district court recently addressed
Kimberly Turic's claim that she was, let go because of
her religious beliefs in Turic v. Holland Hospitality,
Inc., observing that the Sixth Circuit recognized
"employment atmosphere" religious discrimination
claims. Turic, a 17-year-old single mother of one, had
been part of Holland Hospitality's room service staff.
While Turic was pregnant, rumors spread among her
coworkers that she was considering an abortion.
Apparently, several members of the hotel's "Christian
staff" were offended by the abortion discussions. As a
result, hotel management told Turic not to discuss her
consideration of an abortion at work and warned her
that if she did so, she would be terminated from
employment. Turic had no negative entries in her
personnel file about her job performance, but
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eventually was discharged because she supposedly
failed to keep the coffee urns full.
Challenging her discharge, Turic argued that the
hotel fired her to protect the religious sensibilities of
the staff, and that their religion was improperly forced
on her. In essence, a religious test was established as
a condition of her employment. To support her claim,
Turic asserted that in response to the disruptive
"uproar" over her abortion decision, she alone was
disciplined and discharged - the Christian staff
members were not disciplined. Applying the
"employment atmosphere" analysis to Turic's
allegations, the court found that Turic had stated a
cognizable claim of religious discrimination under
Title VII. However, Turic failed to prove her
"religious atmosphere" claim at trial. Unconvinced
that the hotel had held Turic to a different disciplinary
standard than other employees, the court noted that
Turic had failed to satisfy her burden of proof Turic
did not present sufficient evidence that other staff
members were treated more favorably than her
because of their Christian beliefs. Turic also failed to
establish any link between the hotel's negative
reaction to her consideration of an abortion and her
coworkers' religious beliefs.
In short, the Blalock and Turic decisions
demonstrate that an employer may be subject to
liability under Title VII if the employer applies a
religious-based test in making employment decisions,
particularly when the work environment is heavily
charged with religious practices and beliefs. Unlike
Blalock, however, Turic failed to produce sufficient
evidence that her employer treated her less favorably
because of her coworkers' religious convictions, nor
could she show that her nonreligious views were a
factor in the employer's decision to discharge her.
Employers should also be wary of converting the
workplace into a chapel, temple, or other meeting
place for religious observances. In Young v.
Southwestern Savings & Loan Association, the Fifth
Circuit found an employer liable under Title VII for
sponsoring prayer sessions at work. Young accepted
employment as a teller at Southwestern's branch
office, knowing that all the employees were required
to attend a monthly staff meeting at the downtown
Houston office. Arriving at the first meeting, Young
discovered that the meeting started with a short
religious talk and a prayer, both delivered by a local
Baptist minister. This bothered Young, who was an
atheist. She later attended another staff meeting, which
was inaugurated by a short devotional led by a
Protestant cleric. Young did not object to the business
portion of the meeting but felt that her freedom of
conscience was violated by forced attendance at
"prayer meetings." Young decided that she would no
longer attend the meetings.
When confronted months later by the branch
manager about her failure to attend the meetings,
Young disclosed her objections to the religious
content of the meetings and informed the manager that
she would not attend the gatherings. In response, the
manager informed Young that she had an obligation
to attend the entire meeting and advised that if she
objected to the devotional, she could simply "close her
ears" during that time. Young then quit her job,
stating that she could not attend the prayer meetings.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Southwestern
constructively discharged Young because she was
required to attend the prayer meetings - an intolerable
and illegal employment requirement prohibited by
Title VII.
Under the Young court's analysis, if an employer
sponsors or creates religious-based activities in the
workplace, whether it be a required prayer meeting,
Bible study, or reading of the Torah, the employer
risks Title VII liability. An employee may object to
the religious activities, claiming that the activities
create an improper religious-based test to employment
opportunities or create an abusive work environment
not tolerated by Title VII.(15)
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Adopting the standards applied in sexual
harassment cases, several courts have in recent years
looked to the "totality of circumstances" in deciding
whether an employer has subjected an individual to
unlawful religious harassment. In Turner v. Barr, the
court upheld a finding of hostile environment,
religious harassment based on the totality of
circumstances. Turner was a member of the Jewish
faith and claimed that the U.S. Marshall's service
violated his right to a work environment free from
religious discrimination. Recognizing that a single
incident, without more, does not give rise to a Title
VII action, the court noted that Turner must
demonstrate a pattern or practice of harassment to fall
under Title VII's protective cloak. Several incidents
revealed that Turner was subjected to a hostile
environment. Among other things, Turner was
required to suffer reference to the Holocaust by one of
his supervisory deputies. The deputy stated that the
cost or Germany's reconstruction after World War II
was high because of its high gas bill during the war.
Further, the alleged harassment did not have explicitly
religious overtones, but Turner was only required to
show that the harassment would not have occurred
"but for" his religion. After considering all the
circumstances, the court concluded that the conduct of
Turner's supervisors and coworkers was sufficiently
pervasive to create an offensive work environment,
reasoning that both the frequency of events and their
severity justified this finding.
The Iowa Supreme Court applied a similar
analysis in Vaughn V. AG Processing, Inc. Reviewing
Iowa's counterpart to Title VII, the court recognized a
religious harassment action, explaining that the
harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of a plaintiffs employment. To
assess the existence of a hostile environment, the court
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looked to the "totality of the circumstances,"
examining the severity and number of alleged
harassing incidents. The court also observed that in
some situations the severity of the offensive conduct
may lessen the need for sustained exposure. In the
court's view several discriminatory anti-Catholic
remarks targeting Vaughn may have been sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his
employment, but the court did not reach the issue
because the employer had taken reasonable steps to
remedy the alleged discrimination.
In summary, courts have applied several tests in
determining whether an employer is liable under Tide
VII or a state law counterpart for religious
discrimination and harassment. In cases where the
employer has applied a religious-based test to the
terms or conditions of employment, employers are
usually liable for religious discrimination. In cases
involving derogatory religious epithets, courts focus
on the frequency and severity of the comments in
deciding whether the verbal expressions are
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
work environment. In recent years, some courts have
applied a totality of circumstances test in religious
harassment cases, borrowing the legal analysis used in
the sexual harassment setting. In an effort to adopt a
consolidated set of workplace harassment standards,
the EEOC recently attempted to offer guidance in the
religious harassment area, but substantial political
pressure thwarted the Commission's efforts.
THE EEOC'S PROPOSED GUIDELINES
On October 1, 1993, the EEOC proposed
consolidated guidelines related to harassment based
on race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability. The Commission opined that it would be
useful to implement consolidated guidelines
enumerating standards for unlawful harassment in the
workplace. Under the guidelines, harassment
constituted "verbal or physical conduct that denigrates
or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual
because of his or her . . . religion . . . and has the
purpose or effect of (i) creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment;
(ii) unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance; or (iii) otherwise adversely affecting an
individual's employment opportunities."
The guidelines provided that harassing conduct
includes, but is not limited to, "epithets, slurs,
negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidating, or
hostile acts, that relate to . . religion. . . " The
Commission also defined harassing conduct to include
"written or graphic material that denigrates or shows
hostility or aversion toward an individual or group
because of ... religion . .. and that it is placed on
wars, bulletin boards, or elsewhere in the employer's
premises, or circulated in the workplace." In
determining whether speech or conduct is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create an abusive work
environment, the guidelines focus on "whether a
reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances would find the conduct intimidating,
hostile, or abusive." Defining reasonable person, the
Commission observed that it would consider the
perspective of "persons of the alleged victim's . . .
religion." Finally, the Commission stated that it
would review the record as a whole and the "totality of
the circumstances, including the nature of the conduct
and the context in which it occurred."
A CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES
The fundamental premise underlying the
guidelines is sound, namely, to prohibit verbal
intimidation, ridicule, insults, and other conduct that
rises to the level of harassment prohibited under Title
VII. Applying the well-established standards used in
the sexual harassment context, the guidelines
appropriately recognize that any "harassment" must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive
work environment. This standard does not proscribe
innocuous religious beliefs, practices, or observances,
such as wearing a cross, the Star of David, or a
yarmulke; inviting a coworker to church; or just
discussing one's religious beliefs with a coworker.
Unfortunately, the guidelines contained several words
and phrases that created a host of ambiguities and, in
turn, engendered fear among many persons that the
Commission was attempting to establish a
religion-free zone in the workplace. These fears are
misplaced; the guidelines may contain several
ambiguities and overbroad terms, but they do not
purport to prohibit all forms of religious expression in
the workplace.
APPLYING THE HARRIS TEST
The Commission issued the proposed guidelines
one month before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
decision in Harris. To allay any fears concerning the
appropriate harassment standards in religion cases, the
guidelines should mirror the sexual harassment
standards applied in Harris. There, the Supreme Court
admonished courts to review the totality of
circumstances in assessing whether speech and
conduct constitute actionable harassment under Title
VII. Significantly, the Court enumerated several
factors to guide a court's analysis:
* Frequency of the conduct, * Severity of the
conduct, * Whether the conduct is physically
threatening or humiliating, * Whether the conduct is
merely an offensive utterance, and * Whether the




Without the benefit of the Harris analysis, the
EEOC confused the definition of "harassment" by
adding superfluous language, such as "conduct that
denigrates or shows ... aversion toward an individual
because of his/her . .. religion. . . ." This language
should be modified to track the totality of
circumstances test and factors set forth in Harris. The
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Commission's newfound language clouds the
harassment definition because it adds broad terms
such as "denigrates" and aversion" - terms not used in
the Supreme Court's sexual harassment jurisprudence.
Under the Commission's vague definition of
harassment, a person might believe that a coworker
has shown an "aversion" to the person by asking him
which church he attends or saying "God bless you."
The "aversion" language does not appear in Harris,
nor in any other court decision setting forth the
accepted definition of workplace harassment.
Commonly understood definitions of "aversion"
include dislike and other words that suggest
something less than hostility, insult, or ridicule. This
potentially low standard for "harassment" could lead
employers to police legitimate religious conversations
and discussions in the workplace.
Additionally, the "purpose or effect" language is
vague and improperly broadens the definition of
actionable harassment. That language could make
employers liable for innocuous and harmless actions
lacking discriminatory animus. Indeed, even if the
remarks were not intended to harass, under the "effect"
terminology, the employer could not raise lack of
intent as a defense. In short, the "purpose or effect"
language is not consistent with Harris. Likewise, the
Commission's use of the phrase otherwise adversely
affects an individual's employment opportunities" is
disturbing. This terminology creates a vast gray area
about what the terms mean in comparison to




The Commission's definition of "reasonable
person" is too subjective, focusing on the perspective
of the alleged victim's religion. Under this definition,
taking into account the sensibilities of individuals in
the same protected class as the alleged victim would
require employers to know the varied religious
practices of employees to avoid religious
discrimination liability. This individualized
reasonable person standard represents a significant
and unwarranted departure from the objective
reasonable person standard adopted by the Court in
Harris because it places undue emphasis on individual
characteristics and replaces a uniform standard of
conduct with a confusing, highly fragmented legal
standard.
PROPOSED REVISIONS
The Commission's guidelines represent a uniform
approach to harassment in the workplace and were
misinterpreted by conservative religious groups. When
a person is subjected to repeated religious slurs (such
as "goddam Jew" or "Christ-killer"), and the slurs are
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive
work environment, Title VII clearly affords protection
to the victim. This is the easy case. The more difficult
cases involve application of the Harris factors,
namely, the frequency and severity of the conduct,
whether the conduct was an isolated occurrence, and
whether the conduct interferes with the alleged
victim's work performance. The guidelines, however,
contained words and phrases that created more
ambiguity than they sought to abolish. These
ambiguities, in turn, were interpreted by many as an
illegitimate attempt to trammel on First Amendment
rights to free expression and the free exercise of
religion. Given the ambiguities in the guidelines,
Congress compelled the EEOC to withdraw the
guidelines, and the Commission has no plans to revise
them. This is a mistake.
A revised and more tailored set of guidelines
would be a useful tool for the courts, employment law
practitioners, and human resources managers. The
Supreme Court's Harris decision, coupled with several
revisions to the guidelines, would strike the
appropriate balance between concerns about religious
freedom in the workplace and the elimination of
prohibited harassment, including religious
harassment. First, the Commission should revise the
guidelines to mirror the Harris definition of
harassment. Sex-based harassment may, in many
respects, be different from religious harassment, but
any form of discriminatory and abusive harassment
under Title VII cannot be tolerated. The Harris factors
go a long way to help employers ascertain what
speech and conduct constitutes actionable harassment.
Second, the EEOC must delete inappropriate and
superfluous terms from the guidelines, such as
"aversion," "denigrates," "purpose or effect," and
"otherwise adversely affects an individual's
employment opportunities." These terms are not part
of the U.S. Supreme Court's Tide VII harassment
jurisprudence, create further ambiguity, and raise
significant First Amendment issues, primarily because
the vague and undefined terms invite employers to
prohibit afl religious discussion in the workplace to
avoid Title VII liability. As drafted, the broad and
undefined terminology in the guidelines would create
a chilling effect on religious expression; to avoid
liability, employers would prohibit discussion and
expression related to religion.
Finally, the Commission should not overlook the
existing line of court decisions addressing religious
harassment in the workplace. Courts have applied a
totality of circumstances test under Title VII and
similar state antidiscrimination statutes in assessing
conduct that might constitute actionable religious
harassment. Plainly, repeated religious slurs over a
period of time constitute actionable harassment.
Moreover, if the employer knows or has reason to
know that one of its employees is proselytizing to an
unwilling coworker, and the coworker's performance
is affected or the proselytizing is severe or pervasive,
then the employer will probably be held liable for
religious harassment under Title VII. Again, courts
will review several factors to determine whether
speech and conduct are sufficiently severe or pervasive
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to create an abusive work environment. To adequately
protect an employee's religious freedom, however, the
standard for determining what speech or conduct is
sufficiently "severe or pervasive" should be a rigorous
one and applied from the standpoint of the objective,
reasonable person approach adopted in Harris, not the
viewpoint of the victim. The Commission's subjective
approach would require the employer to be familiar
with the varied religious beliefs of its
employees-something not contemplated by Title VII.
In short, the guidelines offer a useful tool to employers
in determining what constitutes actionable harassment
under Title VII. Unfortunately, they go too far and
depart from established definitions of harassment, add
broad and undefined terms, and place an unbalanced
emphasis on the subjective perspective of the alleged
victim.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO EMPLOYERS
The Commission's decision to withdraw the
guidelines left a conspicuous void; employers were
left with little guidance regarding the appropriate
harassment standards applied in the religious
harassment context. To fill the legal void left by the
Commission, this article recommends that employers
treat religious harassment the same as workplace
harassment based on sex, race, national origin, age, or
disability. Indeed, an employer's "harassment" policy
and training programs should make it crystal clear that
afl workplace harassment based on any of the
protected categories, including religion, is strictly
prohibited. As with any form of prohibited
discrimination under Title VII, an employer has a
compelling interest in restricting conduct or speech
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive and creates an
abusive work environment. Therefore, when
confronted with a religious harassment complaint,
employers should apply the standards developed by
the courts in sexual harassment cases. Sexual
harassment jurisprudence is far from stable, yet certain
principles may be derived from the courts' decisions.
To assess whether a religious harassment
complaint has any merit, the prudent employer will
conduct an immediate and thorough investigation. The
investigation will necessarily focus on: (1) the
frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct,
(2) the severity of the conduct, (3) whether the conduct
unreasonably interfered with a coworker's job
performance or other condition of employment,
(4) whether the conduct disrupted the normal
operation of the employer's business, and (5) whether
coworkers found the conduct offensive or threatening.
For example, if a fundamentalist Christian employee
proselytized to coworkers, and the proselytizing
offended a coworker, the employer must ascertain
whether the conduct created a hostile work
environment. That determination will depend largely
on the severity or pervasiveness of the "preaching."
Over a three-year time frame, the fundamentalist may
have informed coworkers on one or two occasions that
the Bible was the true word of God and that the
exclusive way to acquire eternal bliss was through
Jesus Christ. These isolated discussions, however,
would not satisfy the severity or pervasiveness
standard. By contrast, an employer faced with
repeated, unwanted "preaching" episodes that offend
coworkers and adversely affect their working
conditions is well advised to take swift remedial
action.
Unlike these bright-line examples, however, most
cases fall somewhere in the gray area. Accordingly, in
addressing a religious harassment complaint, the
decision maker's task will often require an uneasy
balancing act. The employer must weigh its duty under
Title VII to reasonably accommodate an employee's
sincerely held religious belief against the duty to
prevent religious. practices or observances that offend
coworkers and create a hostile work environment.
Allowing an individual to wear an antiabortion pin at
work, a pin that is part of the employee's indigenous
religious belief, might accommodate the individual's
religious observance, yet at the same title offend
coworkers and disrupt the normal operation of the
employer's business. Under these circumstances, the
employer must determine whether the proposed
accommodation of the person's religious observance
will create an undue hardship on its business. if the
proposed accommodation offends coworkers and
disrupts business operations, then the employer is
arguably justified in restricting the person's religious
observance.
Finally, some employers may have established
religious traditions, such as an employer-sponsored
devotional, prayer meetings, or readings from the
Torah before a company meeting. Here, an employer
should seriously consider whether the religious rituals
or gatherings offend nonbelieving coworkers and
ensure that they are not a term or condition of
employment. However, even assuming that the
religious gatherings are not a term or condition of
employment, religious meetings or rituals that occur in
the work-place expose an employer to a substantial risk
of harassment liability from an employee who does not
share his or her coworkers' or the employer's religious
beliefs.
In short, based on these recommendations and the
proposed revisions to the EEOC's guidelines, an
employer may avoid collisions between religion and
work and, at the same time, accept the diversity of its
workers' religious beliefs and practices.
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Melissa M Erlemeier is an associate in the
employment law section of Haynes and Boone,
L.L.P. in Dallas. They both represent employers in
all aspects of employment, labor, and employee
benefits litigation
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94-2021 GERACI v. ECKANKAR
Gender-Church's discharge of excommunicated
employee performing only secular duties-Estab-
lishment Clause-1993 Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act.
Ruling below (Minn CtApp, 526 N.W.2d 391,
66 FEP Cases 1622):
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause bar court from deciding whether Eckan-
kar, which is hierarchical church and religion
that makes membership condition of employ-
ment, violated Minnesota Human Rights Act's
sex discrimination and retaliation bans by dis-
charging computer systems analyst purportedly
on account of her excommunication, because fur-
ther litigation would require questioning of
church's monitoring of her adherence to church
doctrine, its reasons for excommunication, and
veracity of its responses; trial court erred in
concluding that Free Exercise Clause did not bar
review of analyst's sex discrimination and retali-
ation claims because it should have applied com-
pelling interest test that was restored retroactive-
ly to Free Exercise Clause by enactment of 1993
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but issue is
moot because claims are barred by Establishment
Clause and Minnesota Constitution's Freedom of
Conscience Clause.
Questions presented: (1) Does First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause bar state statutory
remedies against church for gender-based em-
ployment discrimination and reprisal when
church terminated female employee performing
only secular duties, ostensibly because she was
excommunicated, and when sufficient evidence
existed that reason claimed for her discharge was
pretext for discrimination and reprisal? (2) Are
duties of computer programmer purely secular or
"core ecclesiastical matter" so as to constitution-
ally bar any judicial inquiry into question of
whether petitioner's excommunication, as ostensi-
ble reason for discharge, was pretext for gender-
based employment discrimination and reprisal
under state law? (3) Is 1993 Religious Freedom
Restoration Act unconstitutional?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/12/95, by Clay
R. Moore, David J. Duddleston, and Mackall,




Followers of the Eckankar Religion Meet in Minneapolis
Star-Tribune Newspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul
Copyright 1994
Sunday, July 3, 1994
Martha Sawyer Allen
Staff Writer
Eckankar seeks to teach people ways to reach a
universal human connection to the love of God, the
Holy Spirit, or Eck, as followers call it. It was
founded 27 years ago in California
They weren't welcomed when they built their
international headquarters and temple in Chanhassen.
After all, even though they gave up the label long
ago, they're basically New Age, and many people don't
take kindly to anything that smacks of meditation,
crystals, reincarnation and fuzzy notions.
But, really, they're followers of a religion that has
grown over the 27 years of its existence, one that
teaches ways to reach a universal human connection to
the love of God, the Holy Spirit, or Eck, as they call it.
Eckankar - even the name sounds odd. But the
movement, with more than 50,000 followers
worldwide, is having a major gathering this weekend
at the Minneapolis Convention Center.
More than 6,000 people are holding seminars on
soul travel, meditation, dreams, spiritual energy and
reincarnation. They're also reacquainting themselves
with one another and meeting new friends.
"Eckankar teaches that the Eck, the voice of God,
communications with all creation as light and sound,"
said Linda Anderson, spokeswoman for the sect. "This
communication happens all the time, not just in
church on Sunday or during certain heightened
mystical experiences."
The religion teaches exercises that enable people
to soul-travel, to experience dreams as reality and
learn about past lives and the afterlife to open their
hearts to the vastness of the love of God.
So what can be wrong with that?
Well, when the organization built its international
headquarters near the intersection of Hwy. 5 and
County Rd. 17 in Chanhassen five years ago, some
local residents opposed it. They argued that the land
was zoned for residential buildings and that the church
would remove it from tax rolls. More important, some
simply didn't like the sound of what the people would
be doing there.
In 1992 and 1993, about a dozen incidents of
vandalism to the temple and the 147 acres that
surround it were reported.
At the time, Eck leaders said they didn't want to
blow the incidents out of proportion, but the city was
concerned. The vandalism has stopped, said Eckankar
President Peter Skelskey, and he believes it won't
happen again. He said that Eckankar gets along well
with its neighbors.
Jim Eastling, one of the Chanhassen residents
who disapproved of Eckankar's move into the city,
said that he has grudgingly accepted the temple.
"They're just a building that sits there, and there
are no problems I've been aware of," he said. "I just
didn't want a group that taught the things they taught
in our city. You can call it discrimination or whatever,
but [the group is] accepted now. They don't seem to be
going door to door. I do feel sorry for them because of
what they believe. I so strongly disagree."
Eckankar headquarters sits atop a lovely hill
covered with Minnesota wildflowers. Contemplation
trails wind among the prairie acres surrounding the
temple. Every effort is made to create a feeling of
serenity and peace.
Leading a visitor through the complex, Skelskey
proudly showed the ways architecture has been used to
maximize light, air, contemplative spaces and a
sensation of serenity. Almost 30 wall coverings were
used in various rooms and hallways to create just the
right feeling of peace, he said.
In many ways, the temple exemplifies this
religion. It looks almost secular. There are few
religious symbols, but there ae ,many paintings and
pictures designed to convey serenity and meditation.
Eckankar takes many of its teachings from ancient
Asian beliefs and emphasizes spiritual practices more
common in Eastern religions, but it is far more
eclectic. An introductory pamphlet sums it up:
"Eckankar, Ancient Wisdom For Today. How past
lives, dreams, and soul travel help you find God."
Eckankar was founded in California. It's a loose
organization with a spiritual leader, Sri Harold
Klemp, who is revered as the Eck master but not
worshiped as divine. It was Klemp's vision that
brought the international headquarters to Minnesota.
Many Eckankar followers also belong to other
religions, using the practices and philosophies they
learn here in conjunction with their other faith.
Eckankar leaders see no problem with that.
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"Our mission is not to convert people, but to
bring the message of the light and sound of God to
those who've had the experience," Skelskey said.
Eckankar followers believe that we are all
time-travelers who have had many lives and, therefore,
experience past lives often in dreams or other
existential experiences.
The Rev. Bruce Forbes, professor of religious
studies at Morningside College in Sioux City, Iowa,
has visited the Eckankar temple and studies what are
known as marginal religions.
He believes Eckankar is a legitimate religion, but
also believes that followers "don't draw distinctions,
which is why scholars like me think it's all fuzzy -
because they don't draw lines. They say it's whatever
you want it to be."
However, he doesn't believe it's a cult. That label
is leveled by people who don't know, and therefore
fear, the religion, he said.
"My perception is when the New Age was just
coming in, Eckankar talked about itself as a New Age
religion" but later dropped it, he said. "To me it
doesn't matter. Who knows what New Age is? There
are no card-carrying New Agers.
"I don't use the label much. Nowadays it's mostly
used by fundamentalists who want to attack it."
He and Mary Farrell Bednarowski, who studies
new religions and teaches at United Theological
Seminary in New Brighton, believe that Eckankar
meets their definition of a religion. It has a sense of
the transcendent; it has a body of teaching and a sense
of the nature of human beings.
What it doesn't have, Forbes says, is much of an
ethical teaching. It's very much an individual religion.
David Clark, professor of theology at Bethel
Theological Seminary in Arden Hills, said: "The
experience of personal fulfilment is more important [in
religions like Eckankar] than a relationship to a
transcendent God. it becomes a psychological
connection. The words are often the same, but it's not
the same God of the theistic religions, particularly
Judaism and Christianity."
Skelskey said, "We try to open up to people.
Once they see what we are saying, they realize we're
just like them. People are fearful because they don't
know we still love God. Maybe we worship
differently, but it's important that we're all people -
soul - and it's important to uplift the world by our
state of consciousness. Love is an overused word. We
keep asking, 'How much compassion do you have for
others?' "
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94-1903 HOCHBERG v. HOWLETT
Action alleging conspiracy to interfere with right
to practice-Non-compliance with discovery or-
der-Disclosure of members' identities.
Ruling below (CA 2, 50 F.3d 3):
District court's dismissal of complaint with
respect to individual defendant and imposition on
plaintiffs of sanctions for discovery abuses under
Fed.R.Civ.P- 37 when plaintiffs refused to pro-
duce documents and failed to appear for deposi-
tions are affirmed; plaintiffs' action was willful to
extent that their refusal to comply included mat-
ters not legitimately subject to claim of confiden-
tiality, and court, after considering competing
interests of parties, including plaintiffs' assertion
that their failure to comply with discovery orders
was justified by need to protect identities of
mcmbers of plaintiff religious organization, is-
sued appropriate protective order; grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant anti-cult
organization is also affirmed; facts cited by plain-
tiffs to support their allegations that organization
conspired to inhibit their First Amendment rights
in violation of 42 USC 1985(3) fail to establish
connection between organization and actions de-
scribed in complaint.
Questions presented: (1) Is fundamental right
of dissident plaintiff association to enforce its
First Amendment protections on behalf of its
members by class action (brought to preserve
members' anonymity against victimization by co-
conspirator defendants) abridged or chilled by
discovery order to divulge all identities of its
members under pain of dismissal, or does mem-
bership disclosure abridge right to sue in such
cases? (2) Was it failure of due process to require
dissident plaintiff association to establish more
than circumstantial "possibility" of conspiracy to
defeat summary judgment before completion of
discovery? (3) What is appropriate standard to
be applied to discovery issues in such actions to
enforce constitutional protections? (4) Did ac-
tions of court of appeals in affirming district
court's disclosure of member identity and requir-
ing more than circumstantial possibility of con-
spiracy to defeat summary judgment prior to
discovery completion conflict with decisions of
this court and sanction departure by district court
from accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/17/95, by Ian
Anderson, of New York,-N.Y.
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